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NOTES 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business:   
Section 404 and the Case for a Small 
Business Exemption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A frantic bull market propelled the stock market to 
dizzying heights and brought unprecedented paper wealth to a 
broad cross-section of Americans.1  A catastrophic stock market 
collapse followed, wiping out a large percentage of stock 
investors’ wealth and heralding the start of a recession.  
Widespread revelations of fraud and deception, both by 
companies and their financial advisors, wrecked confidence in 
the capital markets and the economy as a whole.  Widespread 
public outcry and demands for change created a congressional 
mandate to make drastic changes to the existing system of 
protections for investors in the stock market.  
This story describes two time periods, 70 years apart, 
that saw tremendous upheaval in the U.S. stock markets and 
the economy as a whole.  Two sets of congressional hearings, 70 
years apart, were held in response to widespread public 
outrage regarding massive losses in the stock markets and 
pervasive corporate fraud that led to the bankruptcies of some 
of America’s largest corporations.  Two sets of laws, 70 years 
apart, shaped the federal securities regulations in the United 
States.   
The first set of hearings took place in the 1930s and led 
to the creation of the federal securities laws,2 while the second 
  
 1 Arthur M. Louis, Individual Investors Gaining Status, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Dec. 28, 1999, at D1 (stating that “[I]ndividuals entered the stock market in 
great numbers for the first time during the widespread economic prosperity that began 
in the mid-1920s. The value of stocks owned by individuals swelled to $5 billion in 1929 
from less than $2 billion at the start of the decade.”)  Similarly, by the end of 1999, 
more than 50% of U.S. households owned stocks.  At that time, those holdings had a 
total value of approximately $10 trillion.  Id. 
 2 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (3d 
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set of hearings in 2001 and 2002 resulted in the most sweeping 
changes to the federal securities laws since their enactment.3  
Each time, the result was new federal securities rules and 
regulations that were designed to prevent future fraud and 
financial losses.4  The most recent overhaul – the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 20025 – is the most aggressive and prescriptive 
securities law in the world today.6  It not only expands on the 
existing laws’ underlying philosophy of full and fair disclosure,7 
but goes further to dictate how companies must be organized 
and what procedures companies must use to ensure 
compliance.8  This note will focus on this last type of regulation, 
  
ed. 2003) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission was created at the conclusion of 
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee’s 1932-1934 investigation of stock 
exchange practices . . . .”). 
 3 President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1283, 1284 (July 30, 2002) (stating that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents “the most far-reaching reforms of American business 
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt”).  See also 1 CORPORATE FRAUD 
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at v 
(William H. Manz ed., 2003) [hereinafter Manz] (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as “the 
most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the Great Depression”). 
 4 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the purpose of the hearings was 
to prevent another stock market crash). 
 5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – An Act to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, 
and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley]. 
 6 See Joel Seligman, A Comment on Accounting and Auditing, 47 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 967, 969 (2003) (regarding the disclosure requirements and accounting 
standards of the United States after Sarbanes-Oxley as the most rigorous in the world).  
See also Bryan Frith, National Australia Bank Faces Big Brother’s Rule Call, THE 
AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 27, 2004, at 21 (stating that the United States was already the 
world’s most heavily regulated corporate jurisdiction even before Sarbanes-Oxley 
added additional regulations and restrictions); Jill P. Giles et al., The PCAOB and 
Convergence of the Global Auditing and Accounting Profession, THE CPA JOURNAL, 
Sept. 1, 2004, at 36 (stating that the SEC governs the world’s most heavily regulated 
market). 
 7 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (calling disclosure the “prevailing regulatory strategy in 
the securities markets”); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some 
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 670 (1996) (describing disclosure as securities law’s 
“favorite strategy”); Marc Levy, Japanese and U.S. Financial Derivatives Markets: 
Recommendations for Loosening Japan’s Tightly Regulated Market, 18 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1970, 1990 n.143 (1995) (stating that the SEC emphasizes disclosure as an 
enforcement strategy). 
 8 See Boardroom Burdens:  U.S. Corporate Governance Reforms Are a 
Necessary Evil, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), June 4, 2004, at 16 (“Congressional legislation is 
highly prescriptive and lacks . . . flexibility . . . .”); John Berlau, Sarbanes-Oxley Is 
Business Disaster, INSIGHT MAG., Jan. 22, 2004, 
http://www.insightmag.com/news/2004/02/03/National/SarbanesOxley.Is.Business.Disa
ster-582737.shtml (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley prescribes a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach that applies to nearly all public companies). 
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which dictates an inflexible standard without regard for the 
fundamental differences in companies of different sizes. 
Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the summer of 
2002, in the wake of the financial scandals at Enron9 and 
WorldCom.10  The abbreviated process that spawned this 
sweeping legislation, however, ignored the potential 
unintended consequences of the law on small businesses, such 
as the high relative costs of complying with its new 
requirements.11  Sarbanes-Oxley’s most problematic provisions 
apply uniformly to almost all publicly held companies.12 The 
  
 9 Enron began in the 1980s as a traditional energy company but quickly 
expanded its interests under the guidance of its top executives with investments in 
such varied projects as a British water business and a Brazilian power distributor.  In 
order to hide these and other questionable investments, Enron used increasingly 
complex and risky off-balance sheet devices to provide financing and liquidity for its 
expansion plans while disguising the true amount of debt that the company was 
carrying.  Eventually, the house of cards that Enron had built collapsed under the 
weight of declining asset values and its own deception.  In October 2001, the company 
announced unexpected quarterly losses and a drastic reduction in shareholder equity.  
In November 2001, energy concern Dynegy agreed to buy Enron for $9 billion in stock 
and the assumption of $13 billion of debt.  After discovering the extent of Enron’s 
disastrous finances, however, Dynegy walked away from the merger.  Four days later, 
Enron filed the second-largest bankruptcy in United States history. See Richard A. 
Oppel, Jr. & Riva D. Atlas, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Hobbled Enron Tried to 
Stay on Its Feet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C1; Wendy Zellner et al., The Fall of 
Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 30; Alex Berenson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rival to 
Buy Enron, Top Energy Trader, After Financial Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1.  
For a description of the complex financial maneuvers used by Enron to disguise its true 
financial condition, see Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Combination of 
Brilliance, Overconfidence Helped Enron Fly High and Plummet Fast, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 8, 2001, at A1. 
 10 WorldCom, once the nation’s second largest telecommunications firm, also 
went to great lengths to disguise its true financial condition.  Its senior management 
engaged in massive accounting fraud by hiding debt, double-counting revenues and 
failing to record expenses.  Shortly after WorldCom’s CEO, Bernard Ebbers, resigned 
in April 2002, new management began to unravel the tangled web of the company’s 
finances.  In June 2002, the company announced that it had uncovered $3.8 billion in 
“accounting irregularities” and fired the architect of the accounting fraud, CFO Scott 
Sullivan.  Less than one month later, WorldCom filed the largest bankruptcy in United 
States history. See Charles Haddad et al., WorldCom’s Sorry Legacy, BUS. WK., July 8, 
2002, at 38; Patrick McGeehan, Grubman Attended 10 Board Meetings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2002, at C2; Steven Rosenbush et al., Inside the Telecom Game, BUS. WK., 
Aug. 5, 2002, at 34; Jared Sandberg et al., WorldCom Internal Probe Uncovers Massive 
Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A1.  
 11 See infra notes 217-34 and accompanying text.  
 12 Sarbanes-Oxley amended numerous sections of both the Securities Act of 
1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005)) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78mm (2005)).  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(10)(A)(i) (amending Securities 
Act of 1933 § 19(b)); Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(15) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 3(a)(47)); Sarbanes-Oxley § 401(a) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
13).  See also Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas:  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 79, 133 (2005) (“Federal regulation under Sarbanes-Oxley, on the other 
hand, is proscriptive and applies to all public companies regardless of their size, age, or 
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law also ignores the special needs and concerns of small 
publicly held companies in the economy as well as the well-
established precedent for creating special provisions in federal 
regulations for small businesses.13 
This note will argue that the current state of the law 
does not properly balance two prominent national interests – 
protection of investors and encouragement of small business 
growth.14  In doing so, this note will propose a partial small 
business exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, the 
section which establishes the framework for the mandatory 
reports on a company’s internal controls that must be prepared 
by the company’s management and its auditors.15  This 
proposed small business exemption would be based on the 
same policies and rationale as Regulation D, a federal 
securities law exemption that allows some securities offerings 
to be made without registering with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).16  Regulation D is a partial 
exemption that benefits small issuers by permitting them to 
avoid the substantial costs of registration when selling 
securities.17  In doing so, Regulation D maintains other 
limitations on the issuer that prevent fraud and protect 
  
business structure.”); Berlau, supra note 8 (“Sarbanes-Oxley goes where the federal 
government has never gone before in securities regulation, not just prohibiting conduct 
but prescriptively . . . dictating one-size-fits-all processes for testing internal controls 
for nearly all public companies.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2005) [hereinafter 
RFA].  Congress enacted the RFA in 1980 as part of its continued attentiveness to the 
problems of small business.  The RFA requires agencies to consider regulatory 
alternatives that are less burdensome to small businesses.  Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical 
Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 216-30 (1982).  
 14 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (stating that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission endeavors to protect investors and promote efficient capital markets).  See 
also Karmel, supra note 12, at 144 (stating that two important justifications for federal 
securities regulation are to protect the savings of millions of workers with reasonable 
safeguards and to promote capital formation by fostering investor confidence). 
 15 Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2005)) [hereinafter 
Section 404].  See also JAMES HAMILTON & N. PETER RASMUSSEN, GUIDE TO INTERNAL 
CONTROLS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 11-12 (2004). 
 16 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 (2005) [hereinafter Regulation D].  See also 
Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6389] (adopting the final 
rules for Regulation D and stating that “[t]he new regulation is designed to simplify 
and clarify existing exemptions, to expand their availability, and to achieve uniformity 
between Federal and state exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation 
consistent with the protection of investors.”). 
 17 Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the 
Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 239 (1990) (“The SEC . . . 
intended the substantive provisions of the Regulation [D] to relieve issuers of 
substantial costs.”). 
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investors, such as restrictions on the number and type of 
investors that can buy the securities.18 While the proposed 
exemption in this note differs from Regulation D in that the 
proposed exemption is based on the size of the company and 
not the size of the transaction,19 both exemptions alleviate some 
of the costly burden of regulatory compliance on small 
companies.  At the same time, both exemptions also preserve 
antifraud liability, including liability under the strengthened 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.20  The proposed 
exemption will allow small companies to access capital for 
growth while continuing to protect investors and deter 
corporate fraud.   
Part II of this note will describe briefly the Securities 
Act of 193321 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 by 
explaining the history and circumstances under which they 
became law.  Part III will then define “small business” and 
describe the role that small businesses play in the American 
economy.  This section will also explain why small businesses 
have historically received special treatment in federal 
regulations by analyzing one significant small business 
exemption – Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933.  Part 
IV of this note will describe the history and impetus behind the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and compare the environments in which 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Securities and Exchange Acts were 
passed.23  Part IV will also examine Section 404’s requirements, 
document the drastic costs involved with Section 404 
compliance, and scrutinize the process that Congress used to 
create the law.  Part V will then argue for a specific exemption 
from Section 404 for small businesses similar to Regulation D.  
This exemption is both necessary and feasible because the 
reasoning and concepts behind other securities law exemptions, 
including Regulation D, can apply to a Section 404 exemption 
as well.  
  
 18 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2005).  
 19 See infra Part V.D. 
 20 See Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 802(a) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-1520 (2005)) and 1106(1) 
(15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2005)) for examples of the increased penalties imposed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 21 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005) [hereinafter Securities Act]. 
 22 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. 
 23 See William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got 
Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders – The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 
8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 73 n.9 (2002) (“The current climate is regularly compared 
to the 1930s.”). 
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II. HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created 
as a result of two years of hearings by the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee to investigate securities dealings and 
banking practices.24  From 1932 to 1934, these investigations, 
often referred to as the Pecora Hearings,25 examined the stock 
exchange practices that were prevalent in the years leading up 
to the stock market crash of October, 1929.26  Among the 
revelations uncovered by the Committee was evidence of the 
enormous financial losses experienced by investors as a result 
of the market crash.  In the decade following World War I, for 
example, companies in the United States sold $50 billion in 
new securities.27  The stock market crash rendered $25 billion 
of them worthless.28  The market effects were not limited to 
new issues, however.  On September 1, 1929 – less than two 
months before the crash – the aggregate value of all the stocks 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $89 billion.29  Two 
and a half years later, in 1932, the aggregate figure was down 
to $15 billion – a loss of over eighty-three percent.30   
These and other reports of massive financial losses 
combined with the crash and the Great Depression to provide 
  
 24 See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 1 (1934); SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 25 The hearings are named after Ferdinand Pecora, who played an influential 
role in the hearings as the Committee’s counsel.  An Italian immigrant born in Sicily, 
he eventually became known as the “hellhound of Wall Street.”  After a successful 
career in the office of New York City’s district attorney in which he was credited with 
the successful prosecution of over 150 fraudulent securities salesmen, he was offered 
the position of counsel to the Committee in 1933.  His political ambitions, however, 
were not as successful.  He failed to become the Democratic nominee for district 
attorney in 1930, and later ran unsuccessfully as the Democratic nominee for mayor of 
New York City in 1950.  SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
 26 Lerach, supra note 23, at 75 (“In the wake of the 1929 Crash, Congress’s 
Pecorra [sic] hearings exposed the rawest kind of self-dealing, abuse and fraud by 
corporate insiders, Wall Street bankers (coining the term ‘banksters’), and the 
accounting firms during the 1920s.”). 
 27 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
 28 Id.  
 29 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 28 (4th ed. 2001).  
 30 Id.  Adjusted for inflation, the $74 billion decline in aggregate market 
value during that time period is equivalent to a decline of over $1 trillion in 2004 
dollars.  Figures adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index; CPI statistics 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). 
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the political momentum to enact the federal securities laws.31  
In fact, twice during 1933 the Senate authorized its Committee 
on Banking and Currency to expand its investigation beyond 
the original mandate of stock exchange practices to include 
broad areas of banking and business.32  During the course of 
the investigation, prominent members of the financial 
community testified before the Committee, including the 
president of the New York Stock Exchange33 and J.P. Morgan, 
who at the time was head of the largest private bank in the 
world.34  In addition, numerous traders and investment 
bankers from Wall Street’s most prominent firms35 described 
the details of manipulative trading devices such as stock pools36 
and other deceptive practices in commercial and investment 
banking.37 
The stated purpose of the investigation was to “lay the 
foundation for remedial legislation.”38  In doing so, the Pecora 
Hearings sought to determine the reasons for the “staggering 
decreases” in the values of securities and to propose legislation 
that would prevent another stock market crash.39  The 
Hearings had another obvious, yet unstated, purpose as well – 
to diminish the public’s faith in the nation’s financial 
institutions.40  In order to enact effective securities regulation 
  
 31 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 
(4th ed. 2004) (“[I]t was the Great Depression and the market collapse in October 1929 
that provided the political momentum for congressional action that would over the 
course of a decade produce a collection of acts known as the federal securities laws.”). 
 32 S. REP. NO. 73-1455, supra note 24, at 2-4 (“The subcommittee has 
endeavored to investigate thoroughly and impartially some of the complex and 
manifold ramifications of the business of issuing, offering, and selling securities and 
the business of banking and extending credit.  It has endeavored to expose banking 
operations and practices deemed detrimental to the public welfare; to reveal unsavory 
and unethical methods employed in the floatation and sale of securities; and to disclose 
devices whereby income-tax liability is avoided or evaded.”).  
 33 Id. at 19-29 (excerpted testimony of Richard Whitney). 
 34 Id. at 84 (excerpted testimony of J.P. Morgan). 
 35 Id. at 5-154. Investment bankers and traders from firms such as Chase 
Securities Corp, Dillon, Read, & Co., and National City Bank testified before the 
Committee.  See id. at 13, 40, 86.  See also SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 24-38. 
 36 S. REP. NO. 73-1455, supra note 24, at 30-31.  A stock pool is an agreement 
between several people to actively trade a stock in order to raise its price so that a 
profit can be made later by selling their shares at the artificially inflated price to the 
unsuspecting public.  Id. at 31. 
 37 Id. at 83-153. 
 38 Id. at 4. 
 39 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
 40 Id.; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1592-93 (2005) (stating that the Pecora 
hearings “were orchestrated to develop an explanation of the market crash as having 
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on the federal level, the Pecora Hearings sought to “galvanize[] 
broad public support for direct federal regulation of the stock 
markets.”41 In its reports on the Pecora Hearings, the Senate 
Committee indicted the system as a whole by demonstrating 
that the system had failed to impose essential fiduciary 
standards on persons whose responsibility it was to handle 
other people’s money.42 
Broad public support and political momentum for 
sweeping reform resulted in the passage of the Securities Act 
in 1933 and the Exchange Act one year later.43  The Securities 
Act focuses on disclosure44 and requires corporations to disclose 
information about their financial conditions and future 
prospects in order to inform investors and allow them to make 
educated decisions.45  The Securities Act also requires 
registration for securities that are sold to the public in order to 
record transactions and facilitate other corporate operations, 
such as dividend payments and elections.46  The Exchange Act 
established the SEC, regulates broker-dealers and securities 
markets, and imposes disclosure requirements on publicly held 
companies and proxy solicitations.47  More than any other 
securities law, it defines the industry’s regulatory system and 
governs how securities are traded.48 
Congress gave the SEC the power to create rules and 
regulations as the principal securities regulator in the United 
  
been caused by market manipulation, fraud, and abuse by financial firms, in order to 
implement an agenda for market regulation.”).  It has also been suggested that 
Congress exaggerated the “effect and existence” of market abuses in the 1920s for 
political purposes – to make the new securities laws seem more necessary.  See Paul 
Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 367 
(1999).   
 41 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
 42 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959). 
 43 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 54, 75. 
 44 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that disclosure is the 
“prevailing regulatory strategy in securities markets”). 
 45 DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF:  
HOW SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 47 
(1998).  See also THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC): BACKGROUND, 
ISSUES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, at xxv-xxx (Brian J. Wilder ed., 2003) [hereinafter Wilder].  
 46 MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47. 
 47 See NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION, § 13.01 (2d ed. 
2001); MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47; Wilder, supra note 45, at xxvii. 
 48 MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47.  See also Wilder, supra note 45, 
at xxv-xxx. 
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States,49 but also placed restrictions on that power.50  In Section 
2 of the Securities Act, Congress dictated that the 
Commission’s rules must protect investors and promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.51  In fulfilling 
that mandate, the SEC has regularly recognized the 
importance of small businesses and carved out special 
provisions designed to address the unique problems they face.52   
III. THE PRECEDENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTIONS 
A. Importance of Small Businesses 
Small businesses are the lifeblood of the American 
economy53 and the source of most of the economy’s innovation 
and opportunity.54  According to the U.S. Census, in 2000 there 
were approximately 5.6 million small businesses in the United 
States.55  During 2000 and 2001, small businesses with fewer 
  
 49 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2005) (establishing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission).  See also James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1205 (1999) (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission has 
been the supreme regulatory authority in the United States since its creation in 
1934.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 n.8 (2002) 
(“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has statutory authority to establish 
financial accounting and reporting standards for publicly held companies under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”). 
 50 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (describing the rulemaking considerations the 
SEC must make). 
 51 Id.  
 52 See infra Part III. 
 53 Susan Ness, Regulating Media Competition: The Development and 
Implications of the FCC’s New Broadcast Ownership Rules, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 533, 543 
(2004) (“Small business is the lifeblood of this country.”); Mark E. Roszkowski, State 
Oil Company v. Kahn and the Rule of Reason: The End of Intrabrand Competition?, 66 
ANTITRUST L. J. 613, 634 (1998) (“Interests of entrepreneurs and small business have 
been a recurrent concern because independent entrepreneurs have been seen as the 
heart and lifeblood of American free enterprise . . . .”); Comm’r Norman S. Johnson, 
Small Business: The Lifeblood of Our Nation’s Economy, Remarks at the 18th Annual 
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation (Sept. 13, 1999), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch292.htm  (“Small business is 
truly the lifeblood of this nation’s economy.”). 
 54 Verkuil, supra note 13, at 220 (“Many of our most innovative high 
technology companies such as those in the microprocessor industry began as small 
businesses.”).  See also William J. Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOK. 
L. REV. 571, 572 (1977) (“Almost every new technology that has given a lift to the 
American economy has come from a new company, struggling in a garage or venturing 
out to obtain needed capital from the public.”).  
 55 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, § 15: 
Business Enterprise 493, 506, tbl. 747 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2004pubs/03statab/business.pdf.  The U.S. Small Business Administration Office of 
Size Standards defines small business as a business that has between one and five 
hundred employees.  Office of Advocacy, Small Business Administration, Small 
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than five hundred employees also created virtually all of the 
net new jobs in the United States.56  Overall, the small business 
sector accounts for more than 50% of the gross domestic 
product in the United States.57   
Despite their importance, however, small businesses 
face unique challenges in conforming to federal laws because of 
their size.58  The Small Business Administration has 
exhaustively documented the unique burdens faced by small 
businesses in complying with all types of federal regulations.59  
In response, Congress has passed laws such as the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act60 that recognize the impact that federal 
regulation has on small business entities61 and require 
regulatory agencies to consider types of exemptions and 
reduced standards for them.62  Regardless of how “small 
business” is defined,63 the exemptions are all based on the 
common belief that a business’s small size justifies exemption 
  
Business By The Numbers (June 2004) (on file with author), at 
http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf  [hereinafter Small Business By The 
Numbers].  
 56 Small Business By The Numbers, supra note 55.  In those two years, large 
business employment decreased by 150,905, while small businesses saw a net increase 
of 1,150,875 jobs.  Id. 
 57 Id.  
 58 See Verkuil, supra note 13, at 221 (stating that the complexity of federal 
regulations and economies of scale combine to disadvantage small businesses). 
 59 See generally The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, A Report for 
The Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) (stating that 
it costs firms employing fewer than 20 employees $6,975 per employee to comply with 
all required federal regulations, nearly 60% more than the cost per employee for firms 
with more than 500 employees.). 
 60 RFA, supra note 13. 
 61 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 115 (1991) (“A primary purpose of 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act is to make regulatory agencies sensitive to the impacts of 
their regulations on small business entities.  This reflects a legislative determination 
that small businesses bear a disproportionate share of the regulatory compliance 
expenses . . . .”). 
 62 Verkuil, supra note 13, at 271 (stating that the RFA urges agencies “to 
recognize differences in size when promulgating rules”); C. Steven Bradford, Does Size 
Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Bradford, Size]. 
 63 United States Regulatory Council, TIERING REGULATIONS; A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 4-9 (1981) (stating that while small firms are often characterized as such by the 
number of employees they have, “small” is defined in a wide variety of ways for 
different laws, including the amount of the firm’s assets and the size of the transaction 
being regulated).  See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(iii)(2) (2005) (enacting an exemption 
for securities offerings made by non-reporting companies if the amount of the offering 
does not exceed $1 million.). 
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from some regulations.64  This belief is not only reflected in 
laws passed by Congress – there is broad public support for 
reduced regulation of small businesses as well.65  
In light of the Congressional mandate for regulatory 
relief for small businesses and in recognition of their 
importance to the economy, federal securities laws and 
regulations have traditionally contained special provisions for 
small businesses as well.66  In fact, when the Securities Act was 
originally enacted, it contained an exemption from registration 
for offerings of $100,000 or less.67  Congress has also added 
other exemptions to the Securities Act designed to help small 
businesses.68  One specific concern addressed by these and 
other exemptions is the ability of small businesses to grow by 
allowing them access to financing and capital.69  Raising money 
in the public capital markets can be problematic for small 
companies in part because of the high relative costs of 
complying with the federal securities laws.70  In this context, 
the SEC has devoted its Office of Small Business to “the 
analysis of the securities laws’ impact upon small-business 
capital development.”71  As a result, the SEC has adopted rules 
and regulations, including Regulation D, which provide for 
  
 64 Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 3. 
 65 See, e.g., Robert A. Peterson et al., Opinions About Government Regulation 
of Small Business, 22 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 56, 59 (1984) (citing results of a survey 
which found that a majority of the general public surveyed favored less governmental 
regulation for small business). 
 66 Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to 
Capital Formation Remain for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 935-36 
(1988) (stating that small issuers are particularly deserving of relief from unnecessary 
legal strictures because of the significant economic benefits they confer on American 
society). 
 67 Securities Act § 3(b) (codified in Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3b, 48 
Stat. 75 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §77c (2005))).  The threshold for this 
exemption is currently $5 million.   
 68 See, e.g., Securities Act § 4(6) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2005)) 
(exempting transactions of $5 million or less that involve accredited investors). 
 69 Johnson, supra note 53 (“[T]he Commission and small businesses share an 
interest in streamlining the capital formation process.”). 
 70 C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 
and the Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. l, 3-4 
(2001) [hereinafter Bradford, Securities] (“[B]ecause of economies of scale in 
registration, the cost of registering small offerings is disproportionately burdensome, 
consuming a greater percentage of the offering price than in larger offerings.”). 
 71 Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies: 
Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 
L. 315, 317 (1999).  See also Verkuil, supra note 13, at 226 n.73 (stating that the SEC’s 
Office of Small Business seeks to minimize the negative impact of the Commission’s 
rules on small business).   
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certain exemptions to the registration requirements for 
transactions done by small businesses.72   
B. Regulation D 
Almost 50 years after the Securities Act was passed,73 
the SEC adopted Regulation D in response to concerns about 
small businesses’ access to the capital markets.74  For years 
before Regulation D was enacted, many commentators 
criticized the regulations and requirements of the federal 
securities laws because of the comparatively disproportionate 
costs they imposed on small businesses that attempted to raise 
capital in the public securities markets.75  In response, the SEC 
held a series of public hearings to examine the special problems 
faced by small issuers under the federal securities laws,76 
especially the effects of regulations on small businesses’ access 
  
 72 Cohn, supra note 71, at 317 n.2 (listing several recent rule changes, 
including reforms to Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933). 
 73 Regulation D replaced three earlier exemptive rules.  Release No. 33-6389, 
supra note 16 (“Regulation D replaces exemptions that currently exist under Rules 146, 
240, and 242.”). 
 74 Id. (“Regulation D is the product of the Commission’s evaluation of the 
impact of its rules and regulations on the ability of small businesses to raise capital.  
This study has revealed a particular concern that the registration requirements and 
the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act impose disproportionate restraints on small 
issuers.”).  See also Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: 
The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of 
Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 622 (1974) (stating that most small businesses are 
precluded from raising capital by selling securities to the public due to the high cost of 
SEC registration); Roy L. Brooks, Small Business Financing Alternatives Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 546 (1980) (stating that the 
regulatory burden on small business issuers is a significant factor in the high cost of 
obtaining capital). 
 75 Securities Act Release No. 33-5914, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,530 (Mar. 6, 1978) [hereinafter Release No. 33-5914] (acknowledging 
that calls for action had come from a variety of sources, including “the Small Business 
Administration, venture capital groups, and a substantial number of professional 
commentators.”).  See Brooks, supra note 74, at 545-46 (stating that small business 
growth had been stagnant due to the “high cost of long term equity capital”); Lawrence 
A. Coles, Jr., Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a 
Deterrent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 462-63 (1975) 
(arguing that the exemptive scheme was “less useful than intended”).   
 76 Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16; Release No. 33-5914, supra note 75 
(stating that the SEC began its evaluation in 1978 with 21 days of hearings in six 
different cities).  See also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (And 
Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J. 
127, 130 (1985) (“[T]he Commission . . . realized that it needed to take a hard look at 
the special problems of small issuers under the federal securities laws.”). 
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to capital.77  As will be discussed in Part III.C of this note, the 
economic rationale for Regulation D – like all small offering 
exemptions – was the high relative cost to small businesses of 
registering securities.78  
Regulation D consists of eight rules enacted by the SEC 
which provide exemptions from the registration requirements 
for offerings made under the Securities Act of 1933.79  
According to the SEC, Regulation D was designed to 
accomplish three goals:  1) to simplify and clarify the existing 
exemption scheme; 2) to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on 
issuers, and small businesses in particular; and 3) to achieve 
uniformity between state and federal exemptions “in order to 
facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of 
investors.”80  Regulation D sets out three separate exemptions 
in Rules 504,81 505,82 and 506.83  Rule 504 provides an offering 
exemption from registration for transactions totaling less than 
$1 million,84 provided the issuer meets certain other specified 
conditions.85  Rule 505 provides an exemption for offerings up 
  
 77 Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16 (“Regulation D is the product of the 
Commission’s evaluation of the impact of its rules and regulations on the ability of 
small businesses to raise capital.”); Release No. 33-5914, supra note 75. 
 78 Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 4.  Many of the substantial fixed 
costs directly associated with registering an offering, which can range from $200,000 to 
$500,000, do not vary with the size of the offering.  C. Steven Bradford, Transaction 
Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 
603-14 (1996) [hereinafter Bradford, Exemptions] (stating that “for small offerings, the 
cost of registration is proportionately too great compared to the benefit”).  See also 
notes 102-38 infra and accompanying text. 
 79 Congress had provided the SEC with specific exemptive authority in §§ 
3(b), 4(2), and 4(6) of the Securities Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77 c(b) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 
77d(2) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2005).  See also Campbell, supra note 76, at 127 
(“Regulation D traces its roots to section 4(2) and section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 
1933 . . . .”). 
 80 Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16.  See also Mark F. Donahue, Regulation 
D: A Primer for the Practitioner, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 495, 496 (1983) (“Regulation D is 
the latest in a series of legislative and administrative efforts to limit the burden 
otherwise imposed by the 1933 Act on small businesses seeking to raise capital.”). 
 81 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2005). 
 82 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2005). 
 83 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2005). 
 84 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2005).  When Regulation D was adopted in 1982, 
the limit was $500,000.  The dollar amount was raised to $1 million in 1988.  See 
Securities Act Release No. 33-6758, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 84,221 (Mar. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6758]. 
 85 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2005).  In an offering made under Rule 504, general 
solicitation is permitted in limited circumstances.  MARC I. STEINBERG, 
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 49 (3d ed. 2001).  In addition, the aggregate amount 
of securities offered under Rule 504 cannot exceed $1 million for any 12 month period.  
Id.  
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to $5 million,86 but imposes more restrictions on the 
characteristics of the offering than Rule 504.87  Most 
importantly, offerings made under Rule 505 are limited in the 
types and numbers of investors who may participate88 and, as a 
result, issuers are required to account for the number and 
nature of the purchasers of these securities.89  Rule 506 differs 
from the other two rules in that it does not set a limit on the 
size of the transaction.90  It instead focuses on the number and 
nature of the investors who participate in the offering91 to an 
even greater extent than does Rule 505.92   
Together, these three rules provide a comprehensive set 
of exemptions93 that, while technically available to companies 
of all sizes, were specifically designed to benefit small 
companies attempting to obtain financing through a public 
securities offering.94  According to the SEC, this design has 
been effective in practice as well as in theory.  In a recent 
release, the Commission estimated that small businesses 
continue to be the principal beneficiaries of Regulation D.95  In 
  
 86 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2005). 
 87 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (2005). 
 88 This restriction is based on the distinction between accredited and 
unaccredited investors.  Accredited investors typically have more wealth at their 
disposal and are irrebuttably presumed to be sophisticated investors.  As a result, they 
do not require registration-type disclosure from companies making exempt offerings.  
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 41.  Rule 501(a) lists eight types of accredited investors, 
among them any individual with a net worth of more than $1 million and any 
individual with an annual income of more than $200,000 (or, if married, a combined 
annual income of more than $300,000).  While an offering made under Rule 505 cannot 
be purchased by more than thirty-five unaccredited investors, an unlimited number of 
accredited investors may participate.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2005).   
 89 Sargent, supra note 17, at 233 (stating that the amount and type of 
purchasers dictates the type of disclosure that is required). 
 90 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2005) (codifying § 4(2) of the Securities Act, 
which grants authority for exemptions (such as Rule 506) that are not limited by the 
size of the transaction), with 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2005) (codifying § 3(b) of the Securities 
Act, which grants authority for exemptions (including Rules 504 and 505) that are 
restricted to offerings where the aggregate amount does not exceed $5 million).   
 91 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2005). 
 92 Sargent, supra note 17, at 235.  Like Rule 505, Rule 506 allows for a 
maximum of 35 unaccredited investors to participate in an offering.  In addition, Rule 
506 also requires that all unaccredited investors meet certain “sophistication 
standards.”  Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16. 
 93 Sargent, supra note 17, at 236. 
 94 Donahue, supra note 80, at 496 (“[T]he new rules were primarily adopted 
to facilitate capital growth by small businesses . . . .”). 
 95 Securities Act Release No. 33-7644, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,114, at 86,114 (Feb. 25, 1999) (“While it is not possible to know with 
certainty, it is believed that most of these [Regulation D] offerings were done by small 
businesses.”). 
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addition, the SEC has reported on the increasing popularity of 
the exemptions, with over 17,000 Form Ds – the required 
notice of the sale of unregistered securities under Regulation D 
– filed in fiscal year 2003.96   
While Regulation D provides relief from the registration 
requirement, it does not allow for complete exemption from the 
federal securities laws.  For example, as with all securities 
offerings, those made under Regulation D are subject to all the 
antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts.97  
Furthermore, there are additional restrictions imposed on 
offerings made under Regulation D that do not exist in 
registered offerings which are designed to protect investors.98  
For example, Regulation D imposes a ban on general 
solicitation and advertising for offerings made under Rule 505 
or 506.99  Regulation D also sets restrictions on the number and 
type of investors who may purchase securities in an exempt 
offering.100  As a result, the limited and specifically targeted 
exemptions of Regulation D provide their intended relief 
without undermining the purpose and objectives of the federal 
securities regulations.101  A similar exemptive scheme will be 
advocated in Part V.D of this note as an exemption to 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404. 
C. Small Businesses and the Need for Regulatory 
Exemptions 
Proponents of small business exemptions from 
regulation rely on the basic economic tenet that the benefit of a 
  
 96 See Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16; Small Business Regulation D 
Exemption Process (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/371fin.pdf. 
 97 These provisions include Section 17(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 
77q (2005)) and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C § 78j (2005)). 
 98 Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 31 (“The choice is not simply 
between full registration or nothing at all.”). 
 99 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2005). 
 100 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2005). 
 101 Sargent, supra note 17, at 292 (“Regulation D substantially reduces the 
costs of compliance for small business issuers without substantially increasing 
investors’ risk of fraud or overreaching.”).  Congress gave the SEC an explicit mandate 
in Section 2 of the Securities Act, stating that when the Commission creates a rule 
pursuant to the Act, it must consider whether the rule protects investors and the public 
interest, as well as promotes efficiency, competition, and capital formation.  15 U.S.C. § 
77b (2005).  The SEC further acknowledged the need to strike this balance in its final 
release describing Regulation D, stating that the rules were designed “to facilitate 
capital formation consistent with the protection of investors.”  Release No. 33-6389, 
supra note 16. 
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regulation must outweigh its cost.102 In fact, one commentator 
has said that any government regulation whose costs exceed its 
benefits is “senseless.”103  In the case of small businesses, the 
relative costs of compliance with federal regulations can be 
disproportionately high, both in terms of dollars and 
manpower.104  This is the result of economies of scale, the idea 
that the average costs per dollar of proceeds decrease as the 
size of the company or transaction increases because fixed costs 
can be spread out.105  As a result, only larger companies and 
larger transactions benefit from lower average costs.106   
Economies of scale are particularly prominent in 
securities regulations.107  For example, paperwork and record 
keeping requirements, such as the number of reports and the 
time required to complete them, often do not vary with the size 
of the business.108  In addition, the costs of interpreting a 
regulation are often extensive.109  In many small businesses, 
the owners or managers perform several different tasks in 
managing and operating the business.110 Since the personnel in 
many small businesses are not specialized,111 it often falls to 
  
 102 Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 5 (“[R]egulation is not justified if the 
cost of the regulation exceeds the benefits it produces.”).  
 103 Id. at 23 (“[G]overnment regulation is senseless if the cost of the regulation 
exceeds the benefit.  We should not pay a million dollars to prevent a thousand dollar 
loss.”). 
 104 See Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 7-11; Overregulation of Small 
Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Reg. of the S. Select Comm. on Small 
Bus., 94th Cong. 30 (1976) [hereinafter Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business] 
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation) (“In a small 
business it is often the owner-manager who must do it [compile and submit the 
required reports], at the expense of devoting his time and energies to making the 
business go.”). 
 105 Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78, at 614 (“Due to these economies of 
scale, the total cost of registration increases as the dollar amount of the offering 
increases, but at a rate less than the rate of increase of the dollar amount.”). 
 106 Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 14.  
 107 “There are scale economies in regulatory compliance if the average cost of 
complying with regulation – measured by the total cost of complying with regulations 
divided by firm size  . . . decreases with firm size.”  WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. 
EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES:  THEIR ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE 
U.S. ECONOMY 65 (1986). 
 108 Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 9 (“[T]he cost to compile the necessary 
information and prepare the required reports . . . is fixed.”). 
 109 Id. at 8-9 (stating that small businesses are at a disadvantage in 
monitoring and interpreting complex federal laws and regulations because the costs of 
doing so can be substantial).  
 110 See Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30 
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation). 
 111 See Federal Paperwork Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Gov’t Reg. and Paperwork of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong. 12 (1979) 
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the owner or manager of the business to ensure compliance 
with federal regulations, which takes time and energy away 
from running the business itself.112  Further, complex 
regulations that require expert interpretation, such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, must be outsourced to expensive 
professionals such as lawyers and accountants.113  On the other 
hand, large businesses have staff specifically dedicated to 
regulatory compliance, which allows management to devote its 
time and efforts to running the business.114 
In a securities offering, for example, the substantial cost 
of registering the offering with the SEC consumes a larger 
percentage of the offering proceeds in a smaller offering than in 
a larger offering.115  The costs of registration, which by one 
estimate can range from $200,000 to $500,000,116 include fees 
for legal and accounting work, filing fees paid to the SEC, and 
printing costs.117  In addition, this amount does not include the 
fee paid to the underwriters, which is taken out of the offering 
price in the form of a discount.118  Companies can use several 
types of forms to register offerings, depending on their size and 
characteristics.119  Form S-3 is used to register public securities 
offerings from most large, established companies.120  Forms SB-
  
(statement of Wayne G. Granquist, Associate Director, Management and Regulatory 
Policy, Office of Management and Budget) (stating that government requirements for 
information are exceptionally difficult for small businesses because their employees are 
not specialized). 
 112 See Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30. 
 113 See Thomas Watterson, Accountants Riding the Sarbanes-Oxley Wave, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2004, at G7 (stating that companies and external auditors 
need accountants with at least three to five years experience to handle the relatively 
challenging work related to Sarbanes-Oxley); Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 8 
(“Federal laws and regulations are often complex – as one congressional witness 
complained, ‘written . . . by lawyers for lawyers.’”). 
 114 Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30 
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation) (“In a large 
business the compiling and submission of required reports is the specific job of certain 
individuals.”). 
 115 Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 24. 
 116 Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78, at 603. 
 117 Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 24. 
 118 Id. at 24-25.  The fee received by the underwriter is the difference between 
the public offering price and the proceeds received by the issuer company.  In a 
hypothetical offering where the offering price is $10 per share, the underwriter would 
sell shares to the public at $10 share, but only pay the issuer company $9.50 per share, 
keeping the $0.50 per share difference as a fee.  
 119 STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 114-15. 
 120 Id. at 114.  Form S-3 is available to companies which have been subject to 
the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for 12 months and have a market 
value of $75 million or more.  Form S-3 requires the least disclosure to be presented in 
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1 and SB-2 are special registration forms provided by the SEC 
for small business issuers.121  Small business issuers can use 
Form SB-1 to register up to $10 million of securities,122 while 
Form SB-2 can be used by small business issuers to sell any 
amount of securities.123  Finally, Form S-1 is used primarily by 
first-time issuers for initial public offerings.124 
The cost and preparation time required for each of these 
types of forms varies greatly.  In a 1998 Securities Act Release, 
the SEC made its own estimate of the hours of work required 
by a company’s internal staff and external professionals to 
prepare a registration statement for a public offering.125  It 
found that only 398 hours were required to prepare Form S-3.126 
In contrast, the special registration forms provided by the SEC 
for small or newly public companies required much more time 
to prepare.  According to the SEC’s estimates, 710 hours were 
required for Form SB-1 and 876 hours were required to prepare 
Form SB-2.127  The most preparation time was required to 
complete Form S-1, consuming 1,267 hours of internal and 
external staff time.128  
  
the prospectus because it allows companies to incorporate information that has already 
been disclosed in previous SEC filings.  Id. at 114-15.  
 121 A small business issuer is a U.S. or Canadian issuer that 1) has annual 
revenues of less than $25 million, 2) an aggregate market value of less than $25 
million, and 3) is not an investment company.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005).  See also 
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 115.  Forms SB-1 and SB-2 are part of the framework of 
Regulation SB, which was adopted by the SEC in 1992 to facilitate small businesses’ 
access to the capital markets.  Id.  
 122 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A, 
Exchange Act Release No. 40632A, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-23519A, 
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,108, at 81,461-63 (Nov. 13, 1998) 
[hereinafter Release No. 33-7606A].  Form SB-1 is used only if no more than $10 
million in securities, including the present offering, have been registered in any 12-
month period.  STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 430.   
 123 Release No. 33-7606A, supra note 122, ¶ 81,584; STEINBERG, supra note 85, 
at 430.   
 124 STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 429.  Form S-1 is the basic, long-form 
registration statement and requires full registrant and transaction information to be 
included in the prospectus.  Id.  
 125 Release No. 33-7606A, supra note 122, ¶¶ 81,461-63 (proposing rules 
changes to allow more companies to use the small business forms, thereby reducing the 
costs of registered offerings for small issuers).  The SEC estimated that 75% of the time 
required to prepare the forms would be used by external professionals, as opposed to 
internal corporate staff.  Id. ¶¶ 81,584-85. 
 126 Id. ¶¶ 81,584-85. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. ¶ 81,584 (detailing the regulation of securities offerings).  The forms 
used by less seasoned issuers require more disclosure than those used by larger, more 
established companies.  Form S-3, for example, allows companies to incorporate much 
of the required information by reference to other disclosure documents filed with the 
SEC, such as quarterly and annual reports.  Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 
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Further, in a separate study the SEC’s Advisory 
Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes 
found that the costs per dollar raised were highest in offerings 
made by companies using Form SB-2 for small business 
issuers.129 On a percentage basis, though, the costs were lowest 
for companies using Form S-3.130  The Committee concluded 
that the costs of a registered public offering for small 
companies and new entrants to the capital markets equal a 
larger percentage of offering proceeds than for larger and more 
seasoned issuers.131  Due to economies of scale, therefore, 
regulations that impose high fixed costs can be a substantial 
impediment to the growth and flexibility of small businesses.132 
Economies of scale do not only apply to the costs of 
securities transactions, however.  The SEC has also recognized 
that they exist in regulatory and compliance costs as well.133  
During the course of its investigation leading up to the 
adoption of Regulation D, the SEC acknowledged that “the cost 
of compliance with Exchange Act reporting requirements is not 
only substantial in absolute amounts but is relatively greater 
for smaller companies than for larger issuers.”134  In adopting 
Regulation D, the SEC intended it to substantially reduce costs 
to small business issuers of securities.135  Additionally, there is 
significant anecdotal evidence, much of it collected by the SEC 
itself, regarding the extent of the negative effect of 
  
Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982) [hereinafter Release No. 33-
6383] (adopting the basic framework for registration statements); Securities Act 
Release No. 33-6964, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,385, at 
83,385-86 (Oct. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6964] (revising the rules for using 
the Form S-3 short-form registration statement). 
 129 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special 
Report No. 1725 app. at 5, tbl. 1 (July 24, 1996), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm.  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. app. A, at 2.  
 132 Verkuil, supra note 13, at 221 (“Laws and regulations, intended for both 
large and small firms, are having an increasingly negative effect on the growth of small 
business. This negative effect occurs in two ways: because small businesses have fewer 
units of output over which to spread regulatory costs, regulatory costs are higher per 
unit of output; and small businesses lack requisite size to take advantage of economies 
of scale in regulatory-compliance, personnel, and data systems.”). 
 133 Exchange Act Release No. 34-16866, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,606, at 83,227 (June 2, 1980). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Sargent, supra note 17, at 239 (describing the SEC’s intent that “the 
substantive provisions of the Regulation” would “relieve issuers of substantial costs”). 
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overregulation of small businesses.136  In recognizing these 
small business concerns, the SEC has carved out numerous 
exceptions to its rules and requirements in addition to 
Regulation D, including exemptions based on the size of the 
company137 and those based on the size of the transaction.138  As 
will be discussed in Part V of this note, the company size 
threshold used by other SEC exemptions serves as an 
appropriate model for an exemption to Sarbanes-Oxley Section 
404 that would alleviate the comparatively disproportionate 
impact which it has on small businesses.  
IV. HISTORY OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
A. Background  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act instituted the most 
comprehensive changes to the federal securities laws since they 
were enacted in the 1930s.139  The Act strengthened and 
modernized the laws140 in response to the financial and 
accounting scandals of the early twenty-first century, including 
the financial collapses and bankruptcies of major companies 
such as Enron and WorldCom,141 and sought to “enhance the 
  
 136 Cohn, supra note 71, at 365, 366 n.6 (stating that a common theme 
revolves around the difficulties faced by small businesses as the result of 
overregulation and excessive technicalities). 
 137 See Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “small 
business issuer” as a U.S. or Canadian issuer with less than $25 million in revenues 
and public float that is not an investment company); Securities Act Release 33-8128, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46464, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶  
86,724 (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8128] (describing the small company 
exemption from the accelerated periodic reporting dates). 
 138 See Regulation D, supra note 16. 
 139 Bush, supra note 3, at 1284 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
represents “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the 
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt”); Manz, supra note 3, at v (describing Sarbanes-
Oxley as “the most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the Great 
Depression”).   
 140 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act “seeks, in essence, to revitalize the spirit of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.”  Thomas O. 
Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville?  The 
Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley of 
2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 138 (2004). 
 141 COX, supra note 31, at 9-10; HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 11 
(“Market events evidenced a need to provide investors with a clearer understanding of 
the processes that surround the preparation and presentation of financial 
information.”). 
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quality of reporting and increase investor confidence in the 
financial markets.”142 
Enron’s free-fall from grace began with its quarterly 
earnings announcement in mid-October 2001, in which the 
company disclosed a large decrease in shareholder equity.143  In 
the less than two months that followed, a torrent of bad news, 
including an earnings restatement,144 cash shortages, credit 
downgrades, an SEC investigation and an aborted merger,145 
drove the seventh largest corporation in the United States to 
file for bankruptcy in December 2001.146 
In late 2001 and early 2002, Congress held numerous 
hearings on the collapse of Enron, which at the time was the 
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.147  Various committees in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives examined 
the impact of the Enron scandal on the financial148 and energy 
markets,149 accounting practices,150 and retirement accounts and 
pension plans.151  The House Committee on Financial Services 
  
 142 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 11. 
 143 Floyd Norris, Where Did the Value Go at Enron?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2001, at C1. 
 144 Floyd Norris, Does Enron Trust Its New Numbers? It Doesn’t Act Like It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at C1. 
 145 Oppel & Atlas, supra note 9. 
 146 See William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of 
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 
76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002) (stating that before Enron filed for bankruptcy 
protection on December 2, 2001, it had been the seventh largest American firm by 
market capitalization); Oppel & Atlas, supra note 9.  For a description of the complex 
financial maneuvers used by Enron to disguise its true financial condition, see Smith & 
Emshwiller, supra note 9. 
 147 Bankruptcies are measured by pre-bankruptcy total assets.  Enron’s pre-
bankruptcy total assets of $63.4 billion currently ranks it the second-largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history.  Enron’s bankruptcy was eclipsed by WorldCom’s $103.9 
billion bankruptcy, which was filed on July, 21 2002.  Figures from New Generation 
Research, Inc., at http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2005).  
 148 See, e.g., The Enron Collapse:  Impact on Investors and Financial Markets: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and other 
Government Sponsored Enterprises and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 149 See, e.g., The Effect of the Bankruptcy of Enron on the Functioning of 
Energy Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 150 See, e.g., Destruction of Enron-related Documents by Andersen Personnel: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002).  
 151 See, e.g., Protecting the Pensions of Working Americans:  Lessons from the 
Enron Debacle: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002); The Enron Collapse and Its Implications for Worker 
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introduced the bill that would become Sarbanes-Oxley on 
February 14, 2002,152 less than five months after the first hint 
of trouble at Enron.  The Committee approved it after less than 
two months of hearings.153  Some of those who testified at the 
hearings, including the presidents of the Securities Industry 
Association and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, cautioned against legislative overreaction to the 
Enron scandal that could have unintended negative side 
effects.154  Outside of the hearings, other policymakers, 
including Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
also recommended legislative restraint for similar reasons.155  
At the time, neither the extent of the financial malfeasance nor 
the number of companies that would reveal these types of 
accounting problems was known.156  The pitfalls of this 
expedited process were apparent even to the members of the 
committee, some of whom openly worried that the negative 
  
Retirement Security: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and the 
Workforce, 107th Congress (2002). 
 152 See Manz, supra note 3, at ix. 
 153 Id.  
 154 See H.R. 3763 – The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility 
and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Financial 
Services, 107th Cong. 8-9 (2002) [hereinafter H.R. 3763 Hearings] (statement of Marc 
E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association) (advocating a “measured 
response” to the Enron scandal and favoring SEC action over congressional legislation); 
id. at 14 (statement of James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute) (“[I]n times of scandal, emotions run high.  And the urge to rush in with 
legislative remedies is understandable, but it should be resisted.  Parts of H.R. 3763 
[CARTA – Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency 
Act of 2002] are admirable, but market discipline and current criminal and civil laws 
provide powerful remedies and protections against another Enron already.”); id. at 17 
(statement of Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants) (“[O]ur economy would be better served [by a] more restrained 
approach because the unintended consequences could be extraordinarily negative.”).  
 155 “We [should not] look to a significant expansion of regulation as the 
solution to current problems . . . . Regulation has, over the years, proven only partially 
successful in dissuading individuals from playing with the rules of accounting.” Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Stern School of Business, 
New York University (Mar. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm. 
 156 WorldCom first restated its earnings on June 25, 2002, almost two months 
after the first version of the bill had been passed by the House of Representatives and 
exactly one month before the final version of Sarbanes-Oxley was passed by both 
houses of Congress.  See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Leaves Interest Rates Unchanged, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at C11.  WorldCom did not file for bankruptcy until July 21, 
2002, only nine days before President Bush signed the bill into law.  Jonathan D. 
Glater, Worldcom Selects 2 For Reorganization Posts, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at 
C12.  
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consequences of adopting a hasty response could far outweigh 
any potential benefits.157 
Current events, however, pressured Congress to act 
quickly and decisively.  New revelations following just a few 
months after Enron’s bankruptcy about accounting abuses at 
WorldCom and elsewhere fueled public support for prompt 
action.158  In an election year, no one wanted to appear soft on 
the issue of corporate fraud.159 As a result, the bill passed by a 
nearly unanimous vote in both the House of Representatives160 
and the Senate161 only seven months after Enron declared 
bankruptcy.162  In the same month it was introduced in both 
chambers of Congress,163 President Bush signed Sarbanes-
Oxley into law,164 declaring that “[t]he era of low standards and 
false profits is over. No boardroom in America is above or 
beyond the law . . . . No more easy money for corporate 
criminals, just hard time.”165   
Sarbanes-Oxley is a wide-ranging law that contains 
numerous provisions setting out, for example, the 
  
 157 H.R. 3763 Hearings, supra note 154, at 30 (statement by Rep. Paul E. 
Kanjorski, Member, House Comm. on Financial Services) (“[W]e run the risk of passing 
legislation very quickly, and then getting the unintended response. I understand we 
are hell-bent on getting this legislation passed by Memorial Day, which is shocking to 
me, because I do not think we know the extent of the problem here.”).  Time would 
prove Rep. Kanjorski correct.  Two of the 10 largest bankruptcies in history were filed 
after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed.  Bankruptcy statistics from New Generation 
Research, Inc., http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2005). 
 158 See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2002) 
(“[P]ublic perceptions contribute to this political environment. Revelations of corporate 
fraud coincided with public anxiety over the economy and populist sentiments 
condemning the insiders who took great wealth out of now-fallen companies.”); Alex 
Novarese et al., Under the Long Shadow of Enron, LEGAL WK., Dec. 12, 2002 (reporting 
that the news of WorldCom’s accounting irregularities in July 2002 weakened 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s opponents in Congress). 
 159 See Ben Worthen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Compliance (It 
Got Easier), CIO MAG., Dec. 1, 2003 (“Congress responds to public outrage by passing 
legislation.”).  See also David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress Rode a ‘Storm’ to 
Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at A1.  In the House-Senate conference 
committee, Senator Phil Gramm was the only dissenting voice, stating that “[i]n the 
environment we’re in, virtually anything could have passed the Congress.”  Id. 
 160 The House passed the bill by a vote of 423-3.  148 CONG. REC. H5480 (daily 
ed. July 25, 2002). 
 161 On July 25, 2002, the Senate voted 99-0 in favor of the bill.  148 CONG. 
REC. S7365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). 
 162 John Paul Lucci, Enron – The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the 
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Bush, supra note 3, at 1285. 
 165 Id. at 1284-85. 
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responsibilities and obligations of a company’s audit 
committee166 and its management,167 as well as the structure of 
the audit committee.168  Sarbanes-Oxley also established the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”),169 
which along with the SEC, has prescribed rules for complying 
with Sarbanes-Oxley.170  These other provisions, however, are 
beyond the scope of this note.  The focus of this note is Section 
404 and how in its haste to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress 
ignored its potentially disproportionate impact on small 
businesses.171  The small business exemption proposed in this 
note addresses some of the unintended, yet serious 
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 for small 
businesses. 
  
 166 Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2005)).  An audit 
committee is “a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board 
of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer.”  
Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(3)(A) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).  
 167 Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2005)). 
 168 Sarbanes-Oxley § 407 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2005)).  See also 
Charles Hecht, The Audit Committee Financial Expert (July 2003), 
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x38835.xml (explaining that although section 407 is 
framed as a disclosure rule, it is a de facto requirement for most boards of directors to 
have a financial expert on their audit committees).  
 169 Sarbanes-Oxley § 101 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2005)). 
 170 See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49544, [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,203 (Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-
49544] (describing PCAOB’s adoption of Accounting Standard No. 2 to govern auditors’ 
attestations and reports under Section 404). 
 171 See infra Part IV.D. 
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B. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404172 
Of the many provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley,173 Section 
404 has proven to be one of the most complicated and expensive 
for companies to implement.174  This relatively short section175 is 
one of the most significant new obligations for companies under 
Sarbanes-Oxley,176 and as will be shown, one of the most 
problematic as well.177 
Specifically, Section 404 requires a company’s annual 
report178 to include an assessment by the management of the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and 
  
 172 Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404:  Management Assessment of Internal 
Controls: 
(a)  Rules Required:  The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each 
annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m or § 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report, 
which shall: 
(1)  state the responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures 
for financial reporting; and 
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal 
year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting. 
(b)  Internal Control and Evaluation:  With respect to the internal control 
assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm 
that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and 
report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer. An 
attestation made under this subsection shall be made in accordance with 
standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the Board. Any 
such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement. 
 173 See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.  
 174 See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2004) (“Section 404’s 
requirements, particularly the auditor certification requirement, have been and will 
continue to be very challenging for public companies.”); Andrew Parker, SEC To 
Consider Rules for Small Companies, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 17, 2004, at 27 (“The 
most expensive provision is Section 404 of the legislation and its stipulation that 
companies document and test their internal controls against fraud.”).  
 175 Andrew Countryman, Law’s Effects Pile Up on Firms; Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Internal-Controls Rules Prove Costly, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003, at C1 (“[Section 404 is] 
a mere 181 words, compared with more than 2,200 on insider trades during blackout 
periods.”). 
 176 Testimony Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 9, 
2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/_files/donaldsn.pdf  (statement of 
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (“For 
many companies, the new rules on internal control reports will represent the most 
significant single requirement associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”). 
 177 See infra Part IV.C.  
 178 As required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 
78m(a)(2) or § 78o(d) (2005)). 
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procedures.179  Section 404 also requires the company’s auditor 
to report on and attest to the management’s assessment of the 
company’s internal controls.180  The goal of these two required 
reports is to provide investors with information to better 
evaluate the management and financial health of the 
company181 and the SEC has adopted rules in order to achieve 
this purpose.182 
Internal control is a broad concept that goes beyond the 
accounting operations of a company and includes procedures 
and processes in every part of a business.183  Therefore, a 
company’s report on its internal controls will not only contain 
an appraisal of its financial condition, but will include an 
evaluation of things such as the company’s risk assessment 
policies and its information and communications systems.184  In 
addition, both of the Section 404 reports are very detailed and 
labor-intensive to prepare.  For example, preparation of the 
report by management on internal controls alone will likely 
require contributions from multiple parties, including senior 
management, internal auditors, in-house counsel, outside 
counsel and audit committee members from the board of 
directors.185  These contributions are needed for management to 
  
 179 Section 404(a)(2), supra note 15 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2005)).  See 
also Securities Act Release No. 33-8238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, 
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26068, [2003 Transfer Binder] Federal Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,023 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8238] (requiring that 
each annual report assess the effectiveness of the internal control structure and the 
issuer’s financial reporting procedures). 
 180 Section 404(b), supra note 15. See also 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2005); 
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12. 
 181 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12.  See also Gorman & 
Stewart, supra note 140, at 156-57 (2004) (stating that the purpose of this section is to 
impose a new ethical standard on the securities markets by requiring corporate 
executives to take responsibility for the financial information published by their 
companies). 
 182 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12.  See also Exchange Act 
Release 34-49544, supra note 170; John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 and 
Auditing Standard No. 2, 97 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2004) (stating that an auditor preparing an 
internal controls report must conduct a complete audit of a company’s internal controls 
and give an opinion on their effectiveness, not simply comment on management’s 
statements).  
 183 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 17-19.  “[T]he scope of internal 
control extends to policies, plans, procedures, processes, systems, activities, functions, 
projects, initiatives, and endeavors of all types at all levels of a company.”  Id. at 19. 
 184 Id. at 19. 
 185 Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,706 (“The preparation of the 
management report on internal control over financial reporting will likely involve 
multiple parties, including senior management, internal auditors, in-house counsel, 
outside counsel and audit committee members.”).  See also HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, 
supra note 15, at 13.  
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report on such things as the company’s framework for internal 
control and the system used to evaluate it.186  
The auditor’s report is even more complex because it 
requires the auditor to render two different opinions.187  In 
order to fulfill its obligation under Section 404, “the auditor 
must evaluate both management’s process for making its 
assessment and the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting.”188  Therefore, the in-depth and intricate 
process of evaluating management must be repeated twice.  In 
addition, Section 404 requires the company to retain two 
different auditors – one to prepare the internal controls report 
and another one to prepare the audited financial statements 
that are required for the company’s annual report.189  In order 
to complete an evaluation of a company’s internal controls, the 
auditor must examine the company’s financial statements.190  
Since an auditor is prohibited from auditing its own work in 
order to maintain its independence, separate auditors must be 
retained.191  
Simply put, preparing an internal control report to 
comply with Section 404 requires a significant amount of time 
and labor from many different people in different capacities 
throughout a business.  As a result, it is not surprising that the 
costs of compliance can be substantial192 and due to economies 
  
 186 According to the SEC, the internal control report must include:  
a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining 
adequate internal control over financial reporting for the company; 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal 
control over financial reporting as of the end of the company’s most recent 
fiscal year; a statement identifying the framework used by management to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial 
reporting; and a statement that the registered public accounting firm that 
audited the company’s financial statements included in the annual report has 
issued an attestation report on management’s assessment of the company’s 
internal control over financial reporting.   
Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,676. 
 187 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 25. 
 188 Id. at 20. 
 189 Id. at 67 (“Auditors must not audit their own work.”).  
 190 Id. at 81 (“Because of the potential significance of the information obtained 
during the audit of the financial statements to the auditor’s conclusions about the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, the auditor cannot audit 
internal control over financial reporting without also auditing the financial 
statements.”). 
 191 Id. at 67 (“This prohibition [on auditors auditing their own work] is in 
keeping with the auditor independence principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
SEC rules under which auditors impair their independence if they audit their own 
work . . . .”). 
 192 See infra Part IV.C. 
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of scale, these compliance costs disproportionately impact small 
businesses.193  These high relative costs to small businesses are 
the most serious problem with Section 404 and the most 
compelling reason for a small business exemption to its 
requirements.  
C. Cost Problems with Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 404 
It has been widely acknowledged that Section 404 is the 
most expensive and challenging aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley.194  
While neither Congress nor the SEC expected that the new law 
would not cost anything to implement,195 the tremendous 
increases in costs that have been seen beg the question of 
whether the benefits of these regulations justify their costs.196  
Due to economies of scale, the costs of these regulations are 
especially burdensome for small businesses.197   
A report on a company’s internal controls under Section 
404 amounts to a complete evaluation of a company’s business 
by both management and the company’s auditors.198  As many 
firms have seen, the costs of audit fees as well as the costs of 
producing information to auditors have increased 
dramatically.199  Since the reporting requirements are the same 
  
 193 See supra Part III.C. 
 194 See, e.g., Sox and Stocks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2005, at A20 (“The most 
notorious part of the law [Sarbanes-Oxley] is Section 404…”); Jackie Calmes & 
Deborah Solomon, Snow Says “Balance” Is Needed in Enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley Law, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004, at A1 (“Much of the Sarbanes-Oxley criticism stems from an 
SEC rule based on the law that requires companies to improve their internal controls 
to prevent accounting and other types of financial fraud.”); Adrian Michaels & Dan 
Roberts, Compliance Brings Business Benefits, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 23, 2004, at 
2 (“[Section 404] is the most expensive part of the new corporate governance laws to 
implement . . . .”).  
 195 HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12 (stating that Congress 
originally did not intend the auditor attestation requirements in Section 404(b) to be 
“the basis for increased charges or fees”); Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,706 
(“The final rules will increase costs for all reporting companies.”). 
 196 See, e.g., Cait Murphy, Keeping Small Business off the Street, FORTUNE, 
Nov. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/print/0,15935,538294,00.html (documenting the 
burdensome costs of compliance for small businesses). 
 197 See supra Part III.C. 
 198 See supra Part IV.B. 
 199 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 40 (“Post-Enron  . . .regulation directly 
increases firms’ costs in part by requiring them to spend more to get information.  In 
particular, new auditor regulation significantly increases firms’ audit fees as well as 
their costs of dealing with and producing information for auditors.”).  See also Deborah 
Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-
Governance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al (describing the costs of Sarbanes-
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regardless of size, all companies have to devote significant 
resources to the effort to conform to Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
requirements.200  Costs incurred by companies to rearrange and 
disclose their corporate structure can be extremely oppressive, 
and potentially devastating, for new and smaller companies,201 
since they often do not have an extensive infrastructure or 
extra staff to absorb these new and more complex 
requirements.202  Large, established issuers, however, have 
found it easier to comply with new regulations than smaller or 
newer firms.203   
There have been numerous attempts to document the 
increased costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance to small 
businesses.  One survey, which defined “small business” as 
companies with less than $100 million in revenue, focused 
exclusively on Section 404 compliance costs.204  This survey 
found that small companies expected to pay an average of 
$259,500 in additional audit fees simply for the auditor 
attestation report required by Section 404(b).205  The same 
study also examined increases in “vendor costs” for small 
businesses, which include external consulting fees and software 
charges but do not include the costs of the auditor attestation 
report.206  Small businesses in this survey expected to pay an 
average of $192,000 for these vendor costs.207  In total, this 
survey found that small companies expected to pay an average 
of $451,500 in additional compliance costs solely as a result of 
Section 404. 
In addition, the considerable costs incurred by these 
new regulations are not limited to resources devoted to 
  
Oxley in terms of out-of-pocket expenses as well as the time and attention of 
management). 
 200 J. Michael Cook, Moving Forward – A Guide to Improving Corporate 
Governance Through Effective Internal Control, available at WL 1449 PLI/Corp 1135, 
1148 (Oct. 2004). 
 201 Peri Nielsen & Claudia Main, Company Liability After the Act Sarbanes-
Oxley, 18 No. 10 INSIGHTS 2, 4 (2004). 
 202 Cook, supra note 200, at 1148; Kristina Shevory, Compliance Efforts Come 
with Big Accounting Bills, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at E10 (“Sarbanes-related 
expenses are rising for smaller companies . . . because they often have tiny accounting 
staffs that don’t have the time or expertise to deal with the new rules.”).  
 203 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 46. 
 204 Financial Executives International, FEI Special Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404 Implementation Executive Summary (July 2004), 
http://www.fei.org/download/SOXSurveyJuly.pdf. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
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compliance.208  While direct costs such as employee and 
consultant time, expenditures for new technology, and 
increased auditor fees for internal control testing may be more 
obvious, indirect costs such as reassigning people and resources 
away from other, business-specific roles can also weigh on a 
company with limited resources.209  Furthermore, the rates for 
directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance210 have skyrocketed 
due to the increased responsibilities and heightened scrutiny of 
directors.211  These premiums were estimated by one attorney 
to have increased “by 100% to 400%, depending on the size of 
the company.”212  As a result of these drastic increases, it has 
become more difficult and more expensive to get qualified 
individuals to serve as directors.213   
Overall, one survey of midsize companies found that the 
average price of being a public company has almost doubled.214  
And since these costs are borne by the company itself, these 
significant additional expenses are passed along to the 
shareholders in the form of decreased value of their ownership 
stake in the company.215  Some of these costs, such as setting up 
a technology infrastructure, will be higher at the beginning of 
the process and taper off once systems are in place.  There are 
  
 208 Cook, supra note 200, at 1148. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Directors and officers (D&O) insurance provides protection to individual 
directors and officers from personal liability and financial loss arising out of their 
capacity as corporate officers and/or directors.  See Aon Corp., Directors and Officers 
Liability Insurance, http://www.aon.com/risk_management/d_and_o.jsp (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2005). 
 211 Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17 
(stating that independence requirements for boards and new heightened disclosure 
standards have made directors’ duties much more onerous). 
 212 Greg Farrell, Accounting Costs Rising as Wary Companies Play It Safe, 
USA TODAY, July 31, 2003, at 2B (citing George Davitt, an attorney with Testa, 
Hurwitz & Thibeault in Boston).  See also Robert Max Crane, Going Private 
Transactions: A Serious Alternative for Small and Midsized Public Companies, 177 
N.J.L.J. 406 (2004) (“[B]y all accounts, the costs of directors’ and officers’ insurance has 
tripled or even quadrupled over the last year.”). 
 213 Epstein, supra note 211 (“As the duties become more onerous, the 
willingness of individuals to serve as independent directors decreases . . . .  Insurance 
coverage supplied to these directors now costs more and has higher deductibles and 
more exclusions.”). 
 214 Tamara Loomis, Costs of Compliance Soars [sic] After Sarbanes-Oxley, 229 
N.Y.L.J. 1 (2003) (citing a Foley & Lardner study which found that the average annual 
costs of being a public company increased from $1.3 million to $2.5 million in the year 
after Sarbanes-Oxley became law).  
 215 Nielsen & Main, supra note 201, at 4. 
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some significant costs that recur annually, however, such as 
the auditor evaluation and attestation.216 
While the disproportionately high costs to small 
businesses have been the most significant and well-
documented problem with Section 404, they are not the only 
rationale that supports a small business exemption.  The 
legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that 
Congress did not adequately consider the effects of the new law 
on small businesses.  As a result, the law’s requirements must 
be reconsidered in light of their impact on small businesses.  
D. Legislative Problems with Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 
404 
In the words of one SEC Administrator, “[o]ut of anger, 
haste and politics came Sarbanes-Oxley.”217  That is not to say 
that reform wasn’t necessary, however.  While Enron and 
WorldCom were the two biggest companies to be engulfed by 
scandals, scores of others were forced to restate earnings, 
which led to falling stock prices and a crisis of confidence in the 
markets.218  Making matters worse was the fact that the events 
in the financial markets that led up to the summer of 2002 
were not unprecedented.219  In fact, many of the fraudulent 
devices seen during the frenetic bull market of the late 1990s 
were simply old schemes labeled with new names.  These 
conspiracies included variations on the classic “pump-and-
dump” scheme,220 which was reminiscent of the stock pool 
  
 216 See Shevory, supra note 202 (“The expenses won’t end when companies 
become compliant . . . .  Businesses will have to monitor their internal controls every 
year and devote additional staff or consultant time.”); Thomas Watterson, Accountants 
Riding the Sarbanes-Oxley Wave, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2004, at G7 (“[E]xternal 
auditors have to go in and test the operational effectiveness of the internal control 
procedures every year . . . .  This work isn’t going to go away.”). 
 217 Tom Fowler, Five Questions with Hal Degenhardt: SEC Regional Office 
Beefs Up to Fight Corporate ‘Betrayals’, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 12, 2004 (Business), 
at 2 (quoting Hal Degenhardt). 
 218 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 7 (“Other accounting shenanigans in public 
corporations include Xerox’s accelerating revenues from long-term equipment leases, 
Qwest’s and Global Crossing’s manipulation of revenues and expenses on sales and 
swaps of fiber optic capacity, and apparently rampant looting by the family controlling 
Adelphia.”). 
 219 See supra Part II. 
 220 In a “pump-and-dump” scheme, several investors buy shares in thinly 
traded companies, fraudulently inflate their price (the “pump”) in order to sell to the 
public at an artificial profit (the “dump”).  For an example of a modern pump-and-dump 
conspiracy, see U.S. v. Benussi, 216 F.Supp. 2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d sub nom. 
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schemes of the late 1920s.221  Furthermore, the seemingly 
innovative use of special purpose entities (“SPEs”)222 and other 
off-balance sheet devices by Enron223 and others bore close 
resemblance to similar practices during the late 1920s.224  
While rampant market speculation was not a new 
phenomenon,225 the fact that history had repeated itself with 
such massive and widespread financial fraud at the highest 
levels of business indicated that some changes needed to be 
made.226 
It is widely acknowledged, however, that Sarbanes-
Oxley was created, passed and signed at a speed almost 
unheard of in Washington.227  In contrast, the Exchange Act 
  
U.S. v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud). 
 221 S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 44-45 (1934) (stating that in both cases, 
manipulation of the trading volume by a small group of active traders was 
accompanied by dissemination of false and overly optimistic information about the 
stocks).  
 222 A Special Purpose Entity (“SPE”) is a “business interest formed solely in 
order to accomplish some specific task or tasks. A business may utilize a special 
purpose entity for accounting purposes, but these transactions must still adhere to 
certain regulations.”  Investorwords.com, Special Purpose Entity Definition, 
http://www.investorwords.com/5799/special_purpose_entity.html (last visited Aug. 30, 
2005).  
 223 See supra note 9.  
 224 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 19 (“This is not the first time that widespread 
financial chicanery has occurred in the context of rampant market speculation. For 
example, some of the speculation preceding the 1929 Crash has a familiar ring.  J.K. 
Galbraith recounts Goldman Sachs’ launching of a series of ‘exiguous’ trading 
companies whose assets consisted largely of their own stock, rose sharply with their 
own value, and fell just as fast.”).   
 225 See CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE 
MADNESS OF CROWDS (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1995) (1841) (describing the rampant 
speculation that has seized markets specializing in everything from land to tulips 
throughout history).  See also Lerach, supra note 23, at 73 n.8 (“This was not the first 
speculative bubble.  The broadband boom has its match in the railway boom of the late 
19th century.  The Internet boom resembled the radio boom of the 1920s, when one of 
the favorite stocks, RCA, went from $1 a share to almost $600 a share in just a few 
years.”). 
 226 Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 8 Stan. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132 (2002) (“Enron served as a wake-up 
call for investors who realized that financial fraud threatened the very existence of a 
large number of public companies and our financial market system itself.”). 
 227 See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.  See also H.R. Con. Res. 
139, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/lawsnew.txt (explaining that bills are 
drafted by congressional committees and based on studies and hearings that often last 
a year or more).  Commentators have also noted the unusual speed at which Sarbanes-
Oxley became law.  See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 159 (stating that the convergence 
of concerns over the drastic decline in the stock market and the series of admissions of 
corporate malfeasance by some of the nation’s largest corporations harnessed a “perfect 
storm” which enabled Sarbanes-Oxley to be ratified by both chambers of Congress in a 
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was passed two years after the Pecora Hearings had begun to 
illuminate the fraud and manipulation it sought to remedy.228  
Since Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, critics have remarked that 
because Congress hurried to pass the Act, it was unable to 
achieve the necessary but delicate balance between the costs 
and benefits of these reforms.229  Specifically, the unique needs 
and concerns of small businesses were ignored during the 
abbreviated legislative process.230  According to one 
Congressman, “[s]mall business is one of the areas we could 
have focused on if we hadn’t been rushed to pass this law.”231   
Furthermore, there was an almost complete absence of 
small business representation during the deliberations on 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  The hearings held by the House Committee 
on Financial Services and its Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities to 
solicit testimony on the bill did not include representatives 
from small business advocacy groups.232 This is contrary to 
hearings held for other significant securities rule proposals by 
the SEC.233  Further, both the prepared testimony of the 
witnesses and the questions posed to them by the members of 
the Committee focused on reactions to scandals and ignored the 
potential undesirable consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
most serious of which have been the tremendous relative costs 
that Section 404 has imposed on small businesses.234  
Together, the well-documented and tremendously 
burdensome costs that Section 404 has imposed on small 
businesses and the legislative apathy displayed by Congress 
  
matter of days.); Novarese, supra note 158 (Sarbanes-Oxley was ratified after a 
“lightning passage” by Congress). 
 228 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 47 (“[T]he law Sarbanes-Oxley amends, the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, was enacted years after the 1929 Crash, following 
extensive hearings.”). 
 229 Id. (“[T]he hasty adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the midst of a stock 
market crash was even less conducive to careful weighing of costs and benefits than the 
circumstances surrounding typical legislation . . . . The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, among 
other things, reversed decisions made in more deliberative settings on such important 
issues as auditor independence and attorney reporting of fraud.”). 
 230 See Berlau, supra note 8.  
 231 Id. (quoting Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.)). 
 232 See supra notes 154-57 for examples of committee hearings which did not 
include representatives from small business. 
 233 The SEC will typically propose a rule in a preliminary release and solicit 
comments on its proposals before a final rule is adopted.  See, e.g., Release No. 33-5914, 
supra note 75 (proposing rules changes that would become Regulation D); Release No. 
33-6389, supra note 16 (adopting final rules for Regulation D).  
 234 See supra Part IV.C. 
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towards small business in creating Sarbanes-Oxley 
demonstrate that a targeted small business exemption is 
necessary for the continued growth and prosperity of small 
businesses.   
V. THE CASE FOR A SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION TO 
SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 
Recently, the SEC has publicly acknowledged the 
serious burdens faced by small businesses in complying with 
some of Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements and taken preliminary 
steps to alleviate these burdens.  In December 2004, the SEC 
created a taskforce to examine the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
smaller public companies.235  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies 
(“Advisory Committee”), as the taskforce is known, will also 
make recommendations on where and how to scale back 
regulations for companies based on size.236  In announcing the 
creation of the Advisory Committee, then-SEC Chairman 
William Donaldson stated that he wanted to examine Section 
404 in particular to see if compliance costs can be reduced for 
small companies.237   
Even though the Advisory Committee is not scheduled 
to make its final report until April 2006,238 it has already 
influenced the SEC’s policy regarding Section 404 and small 
business.  In August 2005, the Advisory Committee 
recommended that the SEC further extend the Section 404 
compliance dates for small companies known as “non-
accelerated filers,”239 and the SEC adopted the Advisory 
Committee’s recommendation without alteration one month 
  
 235 Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Establishes 
Advisory Committee to Examine Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Smaller Public 
Companies (Dec. 16, 2004), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-174.htm 
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Release].  See also Parker, supra note 174. 
 236 Charter, Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on 
Smaller Public Companies, art. B (Mar. 23, 2005), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/acspc-charter.pdf.  See also Advisory Committee 
Release, supra note 235; Calmes & Solomon, supra note 194 (“The agency is focusing 
on smaller companies . . . because the cost is proportionally larger.”). 
 237 See Andrew Parker & David Wighton, SEC Sticks to Core Purpose, FIN. 
TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 3, 2004, at 33. 
 238 Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller 
Public Companies, Hearing Schedule (July 7, 2005), at 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-mastersched.pdf. 
 239 See infra Part V.A. 
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later.240  This followed two other similar postponements by the 
SEC since 2004.241  The Advisory Committee based its 
recommendation on hearings, testimony, and comments it had 
received over the course of its investigation up to that point.242  
In its resolution, the Advisory Committee expressly 
acknowledged that “[t]he costs of implementing Section 404 
have been far more expensive than originally forecasted and 
these costs are disproportionately larger for small 
companies.”243  The Advisory Committee chose not to wait for 
its final report to advocate this change because “the 
advisability of implementing these recommendations seemed 
apparent to the Committee; further study did not seem 
justified.”244  As of October 2005, the compliance date for non-
accelerated filers stands at July 15, 2007,245 over two years 
later than the original deadline set by the SEC for Section 404 
compliance.246   
While the SEC has already created a de facto exemption 
with its series of postponements, there are several sound 
reasons for implementing an explicit and permanent small 
business exemption to Section 404 that the Advisory 
Committee should examine.  First, imposing the same 
corporate governance restrictions on all public companies, 
regardless of their size, is illogical and impossible to justify 
under a cost-benefit analysis.  Not only is there a precedent for 
  
 240 Securities Act Release No. 33-8618, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52492 
(Sept. 22, 2005), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8618.pdf [hereinafter Release No. 
33-8618] (extending the compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its 
first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007). 
 241 Securities Act Release No. 33-8545, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51293, 
[2004-2005 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,335 (Mar. 2, 2005) 
(extending the compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its first fiscal 
year ending on or after July 15, 2006); Securities Act Release No. 33-8392, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-49313, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26357, [2003-2004 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,144 (Feb. 24, 2004) (extending the 
compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its first fiscal year ending on or 
after July 15, 2005). 
 242 Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller 
Public Companies, Resolution Regarding Section 404 Compliance Dates For Non-
Accelerated Filing Companies (Aug. 10, 2005), at 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/coxacspcletter081805.pdf [hereinafter Advisory 
Committee Resolution]. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Letter from SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, to 
Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 18, 2005), at 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/coxacspcletter081805.pdf. 
 245 Release No. 33-8618, supra note 240. 
 246 Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 86,023 (establishing the original 
compliance date for non-accelerated filers as April 15, 2005). 
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creating these types of exemptions,247 there are provisions 
currently in Sarbanes-Oxley, such as the accelerated filer 
provision,248 which specifically address other small business 
issues in the federal securities laws.249  Unfortunately, 
Congress and the SEC have failed to address the most 
troublesome requirement of the Act – Section 404 – and the 
creation of the Advisory Committee is recognition that they 
have not gone far enough to alleviate the regulatory burden on 
small businesses.   
Second, the immense and disproportionate burden that 
Section 404 imposes on small companies has restricted their 
access to capital for growth.  This result directly contradicts the 
statutory mandate of the SEC, which is required to consider 
the effects of its rules on capital formation.250  In many cases, 
Section 404 offers small companies a Hobson’s Choice of 
accepting the crushing burden of federal securities regulations 
that could lead to bankruptcy in order to stay public, or a slow, 
suffocating existence without access to capital for growth.  In 
some cases there is no choice at all because Section 404 reaches 
beyond the realm of publicly traded companies to influence 
companies that otherwise would not be affected by the federal 
securities laws.251  
Finally, any company that would qualify for the 
proposed exemption from Section 404 would still be subject to 
the other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as 
antifraud regulations such as Rule 10b-5.252  As a result, this 
proposed exemption would not weaken or have any detrimental 
effect on the federal securities laws.  In fact, this proposed 
exemption draws on the provisions and policies of several 
existing exemptions, making it both a pragmatic and effective 
solution to Section 404’s shortcomings.  
  
 247 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.  
 248 See infra Part V.A. 
 249 Id.  
 250 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (stating that whenever the Commission engages 
in rulemaking, it is required to evaluate whether its action will promote capital 
formation).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2005) (laying out a similar provision in § 3(f) of 
the Exchange Act). 
 251 See infra Part V.B. 
 252 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005) (prohibiting the use of manipulative or 
deceptive devices to defraud by any means of interstate commerce or on any national 
securities exchange). 
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A. Precedent for Small Business Exemptions in Sarbanes-
Oxley 
Even in the current environment of heightened 
sensitivity to corporate governance issues, the SEC has already 
adopted rules pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley that explicitly 
address the concerns and problems faced by small businesses 
and provide targeted exemptions to alleviate those burdens.  
For example, in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC 
shortened the amount of time that some companies have to file 
their quarterly and annual reports in order to increase the 
relevance and timeliness of the information in these reports.253  
These companies, which are generally larger and more 
established, are called “accelerated filers.”254  In creating this 
new requirement, the SEC has also created a corresponding 
exemption for companies with an aggregate market value of 
less than $75 million.255  These companies still have to file 
disclosure documents such as quarterly and annual reports, 
but they do not have to meet the new accelerated deadlines.256  
In a release describing these accelerated filing deadlines, the 
SEC acknowledged that costs would likely increase for 
companies to comply with the accelerated filer requirements, 
and as a result, the Commission only imposed the new 
requirement on more seasoned public companies.257   
The facts surrounding the accelerated filer provision 
support an exemption from Section 404 for small businesses for 
  
 253 Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137. 
 254 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “accelerated filer” as “an issuer after 
it first meets the following conditions as of the end of its fiscal year: (i) The aggregate 
market value of the voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates of the 
issuer is $ 75 million or more; (ii) The issuer has been subject to the requirements of 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act for a period of at least twelve calendar months; (iii) 
The issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Act; and (iv) The issuer is not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB for its annual 
and quarterly reports.”) (citations omitted).  
 255 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005).  See also Release No. 33-8238, supra note 
179. 
 256 See Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179. 
 257 Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137 (“Although we believe investors in 
less large or unseasoned companies may want and benefit from more timely disclosures 
just as much as investors in larger, listed companies, we are concerned that this may 
impose undue burden and expense on these companies. Smaller companies are likely to 
be more sensitive to any increased costs in preparing their reports. These entities may 
not have the infrastructure and resources available or necessary to prepare their 
reports on a shorter timeframe. Accordingly, we are only shortening the filing 
deadlines for companies with a minimum public float or reporting history as 
proposed.”).  
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two reasons.  First, they demonstrate the importance of cost-
benefit analysis in the SEC rulemaking process.  The Exchange 
Act explicitly prohibits the SEC from adopting any rule that 
places an undue burden on competition and requires the SEC 
to state its cost-benefit justification for its rules.258  To that end, 
in its release announcing the accelerated filer rule, the SEC 
included an extensive section describing the cost-benefit 
analysis it undertook in creating the rule.  The SEC explained 
that the benefits of the rule, such as more meaningful 
disclosure to investors, would outweigh the costs of getting 
information to investors faster.259  To be consistent, the SEC 
should also apply this measure of efficiency in evaluating the 
application of Section 404 to small businesses.  As described in 
Part III.C and IV.C, imposing Section 404 on all companies 
universally, regardless of their size, fails a cost-benefit test 
because of economies of scale in the costs of compliance.260 
Second, the accelerated filer exemption implicitly 
acknowledges that Sarbanes-Oxley will need to be adjusted for 
the unique concerns of small businesses.  As described in Part 
IV.D, in Congress’s zeal to combat fraud and provide investors 
with the best information possible, it largely ignored the 
disproportionate impact its proposals would have on small 
businesses.261  This acknowledgement has been explicitly 
reinforced by the SEC’s recent formation of the Advisory 
Committee on Smaller Public Companies.262 
B. Less Participation by Small Business in the Public 
Capital Markets 
As foreshadowed by one commentator,263 another side 
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley has been a trend of small, public 
companies going private264 or deregistering265 to avoid some of 
  
 258 Exchange Act § 23(a)(2) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2005)). 
 259 Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137. 
 260 See supra Part IV. 
 261 See supra Part IV.D.  
 262 See supra Part V; see also Parker, supra note 174; Advisory Committee 
Release, supra note 235. 
 263 Ribstein, supra note 158, at 39 (“Moreover, a trend toward going-private 
transactions could reduce the available investment options. The effect might be 
exacerbated if going-private transactions were concentrated in particular industries 
that will have particularly high liability and auditing costs under Sarbanes-Oxley.”). 
 264 When a company “goes private,” it or a controlling group eliminates all or 
substantially all of the company’s publicly held shares.  This is usually done through a 
tender offer, exchange offer, reverse stock split or merger.  Going private transactions 
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the more costly requirements of the law.266  In the first full year 
after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, 198 companies deregistered, 
while the following year in 2004, another 134 followed suit.267  
This was a sharp increase over the 67 companies in 2002 and 
43 companies in 2001 that deregistered.268  Given the law’s 
intent to restore investors’ confidence in the market and 
encourage their continued investment, this effect has been 
ironic.269  This trend is important and disturbing because of the 
importance of the public securities markets to small business 
growth.270   
Being publicly traded enables businesses to grow in two 
ways.271  It not only allows companies to raise capital by selling 
securities, but also enables them to use their stock as currency 
to merge with and acquire other companies.272  In the past, 
these substantial benefits outweighed the burden and costs of 
being a public company.  Since the costs of being public have 
increased so drastically, many businesses have decided that it 
is not worth the trouble.273  As a result, more companies are 
  
are more complicated and expensive than deregistration.  See David Alan Miller & 
Marci J. Frankenthaler, Delisting/Deregistration of Securities Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 NO. 10 INSIGHTS 7, 7 (Oct. 2003). 
 265 When a company deregisters or delists, it is no longer required to file 
various disclosure reports with the SEC or to comply with the SEC rules implementing 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Id. 
 266 See Farrell, supra note 212 (citing a Grant Thorton report that found there 
had been a 26% increase between 2002 and 2003 in companies going private); Peter 
Loftus, Delistings Surge After Sarbanes-Oxley, Study Finds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2004, 
at B3 (describing a study of firms that deregistered in 2003 that found “most of the 
companies that deregistered their shares say they did so to escape the steep costs 
associated with regulatory filings”). 
 267 Amy Feldman, What Does Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Companies That Want 
to Go Public?, INC. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 138 (describing a study conducted by the 
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania). 
 268 Id. 
 269 Claudia H. Deutsche, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2005, § 3 at 5 (stating that while being intended to promote additional corporate 
transparency, Sarbanes-Oxley is inducing some companies to become less transparent); 
William D. Holyoak, Corporate Reform: Can Utah’s Small Public Companies Survive 
Sarbanes-Oxley?, UTAH BUS., June 1, 2003, at 42 (“[I]t certainly is ironic that a law 
born of corruption at some of the country’s largest public companies may end up 
incapacitating many small-cap companies.”); Ribstein, supra note 158, at 39 (stating 
that a trend toward companies going private “would be ironic in light of the law’s 
[Sarbanes-Oxley’s] intent to lure investors back into the market”). 
 270 Romano, supra note 40, at 1589 (stating that although difficult to quantify, 
the costs associated with the decrease in financing opportunities for small businesses 
could be substantial). 
 271 See Crane, supra note 212, at 406. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Deutsche, supra note 269 (stating that some companies would rather use 
their time and money to grow their businesses than spend it on compliance). 
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removing themselves from the requirements of being public by 
deregistering or going private. 
The recent trend in companies leaving the public 
markets has been largely attributed to the new Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirements,274 and specifically to Section 404.275  For example, 
another study examined the 198 firms that deregistered in 
2003 and found that most of them did so because of the 
extreme costs associated with the regulations.276  In addition, 
numerous recent articles have documented anecdotal evidence 
that small public companies are fleeing the public markets in 
droves because of stifling compliance costs.277  As a result of 
these costs, more and more companies are trading some of their 
long-term growth potential for short-term solvency.278  
Furthermore, while Sarbanes-Oxley is the law for most 
public companies, small businesses do not have to be public 
companies for Sarbanes-Oxley to affect them.279  Companies 
only need to consider the prospect of becoming public for these 
overly burdensome requirements to chill their plans to seek 
public financing.280  While there are no statistics kept on the 
number of private companies that eschew public financing or 
why they do so, there has been increasing anecdotal evidence 
that fewer private companies are considering going public 
  
 274 Loftus, supra note 266. 
 275 Susan Greco, Is Life Really Better Without Sarbanes-Oxley and Quarterly 
Earnings Calls? Three Public Companies That Went Private Say Yes, D & O ADVISOR, 
Jan. 1, 2005, at 20 (“Things like Section 404 push more companies to want to go 
private . . . .”). 
 276 Loftus, supra note 266.   
 277 See, e.g., Angus Loten, Sarbox No Picnic for Teddy Bear Maker, INC. 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 5, 2005, available at http://www.inc.com/criticalnews/ 
articles/200510/bears.html (describing the extensive costs and burdens placed on the 
Vermont Teddy Bear Company by Section 404); Laurence B. Beckler, Outside Counsel; 
Deregistering with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 231 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2004); 
Deutsche, supra note 269; Greco, supra note 275; Melinda Ligos, When Going Public 
May Not Be Worth It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C7. 
 278 See Murphy, supra note 196 (documenting the burdensome costs of 
compliance for small businesses). 
 279 Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes-Oxley, INC. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 
132 (quoting Mark Jensen, national director of VC services for the San Jose, Calif., 
office of Deloitte & Touche:  “Unless you are a 100% family-owned business and 100% 
self-financed, you’re going to be impacted by Sarbanes-Oxley.”).  
 280 See Peter H. Ehrenberg & Anthony O. Pergola, Why Private Companies 
Should Not Ignore the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WALL STREET LAW., Dec. 2002, at 12 
(stating that private companies that are considering accessing the public markets 
should consider the costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley); Greco, supra note 275 
(stating that a company that is thinking about going public or being acquired by a 
public company may adopt Section 404-type controls). 
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because of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs.281  It is also 
noteworthy that some of the other hurdles that companies 
would have to overcome in order to sell securities to the public 
are relatively low.  For example, notwithstanding several 
shareholder-specific requirements, a company need only have 
$1 million of annual income before taxes and a share price of 
five dollars in order to list on the NASDAQ National Market,282 
and the threshold is even lower for the NASDAQ Small Cap 
Market.283 
C. Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Laws Still Apply  
As important as what a small business exemption to 
Section 404 would do is what an exemption would not do.  Any 
small business exemption to Section 404 would not compromise 
the goals of investor protection and fraud prevention, which are 
at the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley and all of the federal securities 
laws.284  All exemptions, including Regulation D, require that 
companies still comply with the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws,285 including Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act286 and Rule 10b-5,287 the chief anti-fraud 
provision promulgated under the Exchange Act.288   
In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley has already increased the 
deterrent component of the existing antifraud rules by 
significantly increasing the criminal penalties attached to 
them.  For example, criminal penalties for violations of the 
Exchange Act, under which Rule 10b-5 is promulgated, have 
been increased to $5 million in fines and twenty years in prison 
  
 281 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 196. 
 282 NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 4420(a)(1).  
 283 In order to qualify for an initial listing on the NASDAQ Small Cap Market, 
a company must have net income from continuing operations of at least $750,000 in the 
latest fiscal year or two of the last three fiscal years.  NASDAQ Listing Standards and 
Fees, March 2005, http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. 
 284 STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 1. 
 285 Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16 (discussing Preliminary Note 1, which 
states that Regulation D does not exempt issuers from the antifraud or civil liability 
provisions of the federal securities laws); see also Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78, 
at 609. 
 286 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2005). 
 287 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
 288 J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the 
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318 n.6 (2004) (describing 
Rule 10b-5 as the “most significant antifraud provision” of the federal securities laws); 
Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure:  The Internet, Securities Fraud, 
and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1998) (stating that Rule 10b-5 is the “most 
significant antifraud securities provision in the world”). 
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for individuals.289  In addition, any person who knowingly alters 
or destroys documents in order to obstruct an investigation can 
be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison.290  Furthermore, 
each incidence of mail and wire fraud is now punishable by up 
to twenty years in prison as well.291  These severe penalties 
serve as powerful deterrents to securities fraud on their own 
and operate independently of the management reporting 
requirement of Section 404.   
There is a common sense aspect to this argument as 
well.  The corporate misconduct that was committed at 
companies like Enron and WorldCom was criminal before 
Sarbanes-Oxley.292  If a corporate officer or director had no 
qualms about violating existing rules against fraud and 
manipulation, then it is doubtful that simply adding another 
report to complete would have any more of an effect on his or 
her behavior.293  On the other hand, the threat of twenty years 
in prison and a $5 million fine for each incident of securities 
fraud will serve as a much more powerful deterrent for 
wrongdoing than the additional reporting requirements of 
Section 404.294 
D. The Proposed Exemption 
For the reasons stated above, a small business 
exemption to Section 404 must be created in order to protect 
the continued growth and prosperity of the nation’s small 
businesses.  While the Advisory Committee could recommend 
action by either Congress or the SEC,295 the language of the 
  
 289 Sarbanes-Oxley § 1106(1) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2005)). 
 290 Sarbanes-Oxley § 802(a) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2005)). 
 291 Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 903(a)-(b) (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2005)). 
 292 Karmel, supra note 12, at 133 (“The financial misreporting at Enron, 
Adelphia, WorldCom, and elsewhere was already illegal, indeed criminal.”). 
 293 Douglas M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction 
or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1008 (2003) 
(“Corporate codes of conduct have been around for approximately twenty years.  Enron 
had a code.  Codes can serve to raise the level of ethical behavior within an 
organization, but only if they are taken seriously and enforced.”). 
 294 Andrew Hill, Scandals Are Nothing New To Wall Street, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON), Aug. 12, 2002, at 32 (“[I]t has taken the threat of criminal litigation to 
persuade the firms they need to take more radical action than they originally 
suggested was necessary.”). 
 295 It is not clear if such an exemption can be created by the SEC or if 
Congress would have to amend the statute.  While Section 404 gives the SEC explicit 
power to make rules regarding the internal control reports that a company must file as 
part of its annual report, Section 404 does not give the SEC explicit exemptive 
authority.  This is in contrast to other exemptions that are based on explicit statutory 
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release that announced the creation of the Advisory Committee 
indicates that the SEC presumes to have the power to make 
these rule changes.296  A complete analysis of the SEC’s 
rulemaking and exemptive authority, however, is beyond the 
scope of this note. 
The main provision of this proposed exemption would 
allow a company to file its management report on internal 
controls without the independent auditor’s attestation report 
that is required by Section 404(b).  In addition, officers and 
directors of companies eligible for the exemption would not be 
subject to the enhanced criminal penalties for filing a false or 
misleading certification under Section 404. 
In order to be eligible for this proposed small business 
exemption, a company would have to have a public float297 of 
less than $75 million, as measured on the last day of the 
company’s most recent fiscal year.  This size threshold is the 
same as in the accelerated filer exemption as well as other 
  
authority, such as Regulation D (promulgated under § 3(b) of the Securities Act).  
There is a precedent, however, for the SEC exercising exemptive rulemaking power 
without specific statutory authority.  Pursuant to the Williams Act (Pub. L. No. 90-439, 
82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2005))), 
which protects securities holders from unfair and deceptive practices in tender offers, 
the SEC created Rule 14d-8, which provides an exemption for bidders in a tender offer.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2005).  See also AARON RACHELSON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 
MERGERS AND DIVESTITURES § 8:21 (2005) (describing the exemption created by Rule 
14d-8).  Rule 14d-8, however, was adopted as part of § 14d-6 of the Exchange Act (15 
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2005)), which does not grant specific exemptive authority to the 
Commission.  Instead, the SEC relied on its authority under a different section of the 
Williams Act to adopt Rule 14d-8.  In doing so, the Commission acknowledged that it 
had technically exceeded its authority under § 14d-6 but asserted that its expanded 
power was justified based on necessity and the intent of Congress.  Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-18761, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,221 (May 
25, 1982) (describing the SEC’s rationale for its authority to adopt Rule 14d-8).  See 
also William C. Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation:  
Post-Tender Offer Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 n.32 (1982) 
(describing the SEC’s questionable authority to adopt Rule 14d-8).  In that case, the 
Commission also relied on its general rulemaking power granted by § 23(a) of the 
Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2005) (granting the SEC the power to make rules 
and regulations to implement provisions of the Exchange Act). 
 296 Advisory Committee Release, supra note 235 (“[T]he Commission expects 
the committee to provide recommendations as to where and how the Commission 
should draw lines to scale regulatory treatments for companies based on size.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 297 A company’s float is the market value of the company’s equity shares 
outstanding.  This number is calculated by multiplying the number of shares 
outstanding by the market price of the shares.  Investorwords.com, Public Float 
Definition, at http://www.investorwords.com/3936/public_float.html (last visited Aug. 
30, 2005).  
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significant securities regulations,298 and this consistency will 
simplify one aspect of the notoriously complex federal securities 
laws.299  By measuring the company’s float at the end of the 
fiscal year, this proposal is also consistent with the standard 
established in the accelerated filer provision.300  In addition, the 
SEC has already explained that the public float test serves as a 
“reasonable measure of company size and market interest.”301  
The SEC also established that this threshold, which excludes 
nearly half of all publicly traded companies and all the 
companies eligible for the SEC’s small business reporting 
system from the accelerated filer provision, forms a group of 
companies worthy of an exemption based on their size.302  It is 
therefore likely that the SEC would consider this group 
deserving of an exemption from the high relative costs of 
Section 404 as well.  
This proposed exemption would be effective because it 
addresses several of the key issues that have plagued small 
businesses while continuing to protect investors.  First, it 
eliminates several significant costs associated with Section 404 
compliance.  An eligible small company would be able to forego 
an additional costly review of its entire business every year by 
an independent auditor.  Furthermore, by exempting directors 
and officers at eligible companies from the harsh penalties 
associated with Section 404, D&O insurance providers could 
lower premiums on policies for directors and officers of small 
companies.  As described in Part IV.C, D&O insurance costs 
have skyrocketed in response to the new requirements of 
Section 404.  As a result of this exemption, directors and 
officers could obtain the insurance coverage they need without 
sacrificing protection or incurring exorbitant premiums. 
Second, since many of the federal securities laws would 
still apply to these companies, the actual terms of the proposed 
provision would more accurately be described as a “partial 
  
 298 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “accelerated filer”).  See also Release 
Nos. 33-6383 & 33-6964, supra note 128 (describing Form S-3 for registration 
statements). 
 299 This rationale was also cited by the SEC in its adoption of the $75 million 
float threshold for the accelerated filer provision.  Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137 
(“In identifying companies that will be subject to this new requirement, we also 
thought it would be appropriate to use a pre-existing threshold to reduce regulatory 
complexity.”). 
 300 Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137, ¶ 86,185. 
 301 Id. (adopting amendments to the SEC’s rules and forms to accelerate the 
filing of quarterly and annual reports under the Exchange Act). 
 302 Id. 
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exemption.”  As in Regulation D, all the antifraud provisions of 
the federal securities laws would still apply to a company 
eligible for this exemption.  As stated above, the current rules 
provide the SEC with powerful antifraud tools and newly 
enhanced criminal penalties for securities fraud, which are 
both effective deterrents and adequate punishment for 
wrongdoers.  The proposed exemption would only exempt 
managers from the enhanced criminal penalties for violations 
of Section 404, not for securities fraud.  Therefore, the SEC’s 
enforcement capability would not be weakened in any way by 
this proposal.  In addition, under this proposal, companies that 
fall below the $75 million public float threshold would still be 
required to submit a management report on internal controls, 
but the report would not have to be certified by independent 
auditors.  As a result, investors would still receive the standard 
types of disclosure information from the company’s 
management, such as audited financial statements.303  
Finally, companies eligible for this proposed exemption 
would still have incentives to create sound, effective corporate 
governance practices.  Doing so would give a company a solid 
corporate governance foundation and make it easier for that 
company to eventually comply with Section 404 if and when it 
outgrows the small business exemption.  In addition, even 
though this proposed exemption would allow a company to 
remain public without fully complying with Section 404, there 
is no guarantee that investors will continue to commit capital 
to a company without proof of its solid financial standing and 
sound management practices.  Since the goal of this proposed 
exemption is to allow small companies to continue to access the 
public capital markets, any eligible company that neglected to 
take its corporate governance responsibilities seriously would 
violate the spirit and purpose of the exemption, and probably 
induce a precipitous drop in that company’s stock price.  
Companies that did effectively use the exemption, however, 
would benefit by continuing to expand through access to the 
public capital markets without exorbitant compliance costs 
strangling their profits and their ability to grow.304 
  
 303 SEC Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2005). 
 304 Neal L. Wolkoff, Chairman & CEO, American Stock Exchange, Sarbanes-
Oxley Is a Curse for Small-Cap Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A13 (“We 
need to implement regulations that allow [small companies] to compete, not kill them 
off with red tape.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The federal securities laws provide the essential 
regulatory framework for the financial markets and the 
economy as a whole.  The recent scandals at Enron and 
elsewhere demonstrate that their protections are needed now 
as much as ever, and Sarbanes-Oxley has modernized and 
strengthened those protections for the twenty-first century.  
That need for protection, however, must be balanced with the 
objective of promoting economic growth. 
Accordingly, the federal securities laws have evolved 
over the years to include exemptions such as Regulation D to 
fine-tune securities regulations and alleviate some of the high 
relative costs to small businesses which result from economies 
of scale.  Currently, there is no provision in the federal 
securities laws that imposes a more disproportionate burden on 
small businesses than Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404.   
By forming the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public 
Companies, the SEC has taken an important first step in a 
much-needed reevaluation of Sarbanes-Oxley and its effects on 
small businesses.  While the Advisory Committee will have to 
examine the balance between the costs and benefits of the new 
regulations, it is clear that Section 404 does not strike an 
appropriate balance between these costs and benefits for small 
businesses.  As a result, a small business exemption from 
Section 404 is both necessary and long overdue. 
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The small business exemption proposed in this note 
addresses some of the main problems with the current state of 
the law, most importantly the high relative costs to small 
businesses and their impact on businesses’ access to capital.  
The proposal is based on the reasoning and concepts behind 
two existing exemptions and incorporates aspects of both to 
create a practical and effective exemption that successfully 
balances the investor protection and capital formation goals of 
the federal securities laws.  This proposal also draws on the 
effectiveness of other recent corporate governance reforms, 
including strengthened antifraud laws.  These reforms provide 
an important safety net that would enable this exemption to 
function effectively while continuing to serve the important 
policy goals of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The positive effects of such an 
exemption would extend beyond small businesses and have a 
beneficial impact on the economy as a whole. 
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